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Czar Cullen
Police Commissioner John Cullen and coercive state action in 
early 20th century NZ
Introduction 
“Police and policing are symbolically and practically at the very core of the 
State; they represent one of the few institutions charged with the legitimate 
use of force in the service of the State, and, more abstractly, the public; 
they are highly visible and often contested by those who challenge how 
that force can and should be deployed; and they are beset by endemic 
contradictions. Chief amongst those contradictions is the mandate of 
the police simultaneously to protect, reassure and control the populace, 
a mandate that cannot but engender abiding dilemmas of policy and 
practice.”
(NG Fielding, The Police and Social Conflict, p. vii-viii)
Given the central and inherently contested role of policing in the modern state, it is striking 
to note the generally limited historical interest in the place of policing as a factor in the 
development of New Zealand’s civil society. To some extent this can be attributed to 
the imbalance, noted by British police historian Samuel Palmer, in favour of studies of 
those challenging authority compared with those enforcing it.1 In this country it may also 
reflect an historical view of the police, at least since the early 20th century, as generally 
trustworthy civil servants whose actions are constrained and overseen by the executive arm 
of government. It is my contending view that certain well known, and lesser known yet 
1 Palmer S, Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 
preface p. xv
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still significant, events in our recent history may owe more to the unilateral decisions and 
actions of the senior police officers in charge than historians have tended to acknowledge. 
The following study examines the background and career of one of New Zealand’s most 
notable police officers, the first to rise from the lowest rank to the highest position in 
the national force. John Cullen’s career also happened to coincide with the growth of 
the modern, post-Armed Constabulary, police and it encompassed many of the most 
significant events of his time, events in which his role was often central and at times 
decisive. Most importantly for the purposes of the present study, Cullen’s style of policing, 
noticeable throughout his long career but especially marked once he achieved senior rank, 
ran counter to the overall development of the force in which he served, a development 
away from overt coercion towards more consensual policing. A longitudinal study of 
Cullen’s career therefore serves to examine that wider development through its darker 
mirror-image, as the revealing exception to the more accepted rule. 
The move towards consensual policing, the most important trend within the force from the 
late 19th century until the mid-1930s, was measurable both in terms of internal discipline 
and external tactics. By both measures Cullen represented an anomaly, a return to an earlier 
form of para-military policing marked by rigid and even intimidatory internal discipline, 
and forceful coercion of targeted social groups in which extreme, even occasionally fatal, 
violence was considered an acceptable consequence. One question explored by this study 
is the extent to which Cullen can be held directly responsible for the reactionary trend 
towards greater police coercion, given that his term as Police Commissioner coincided 
with such overwhelmingly disruptive and exceptional historical moments as the outbreak 
of World War One. 
The most characteristic features of John Cullen’s style of policing – an emphasis on physical 
force, rigid discipline both on and off duty, constant close surveillance of targeted groups 
and recourse to the use of arms and military or para-military personnel and tactics – were 
standard practice in the 19th century Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), in which he was 
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trained and whose officers and attitudes he favoured throughout his career. This study 
therefore examines in some detail Cullen’s early years as an RIC trainee and young Irish 
constable, for the understanding this period provides of many of his later, at times otherwise 
startling, policing decisions. The study then deals briefly with Cullen’s early years in this 
country, and in more detail with the most significant episodes in his later career. Some 
of those latter episodes are among the most prominent in our early-20th century history 
and have been the subject of various popular and scholarly studies.2 In those cases I have 
endeavoured, to a layman’s extent, to treat those events from a policing perspective, in the 
hope of providing a fresh and historically rewarding slant on relatively familiar events.
Sources for this project
As noted above, and with the distinguished exception of the multi-volume official 
police history, policing has not generally engaged much historical attention in this 
country. Primary sources, in particular Police, Defence and other government archives, 
contemporary newspapers and a number of theses and other unpublished academic 
papers have therefore supplied the bulk of my research materials. The section on the 
Royal Irish Constabulary, for which a number of useful published works was available, is 
an exception to this general rule. Recent general histories of New Zealand have paid scant 
attention to John Cullen. He rates a single passing reference as ‘authoritarian’ in Michael 
King’s Penguin History of New Zealand, with reference to his actions during the 1912 Waihi 
strike, ‘ostensibly to restore order but in fact to crack down on the striking unionists’.3 
The second volume of James Belich’s ‘history of the New Zealanders’ treats Cullen in slightly 
more depth, both for his role at Waihi and in the subsequent and nationwide 1913 strike. 
Belich also touches on Cullen’s re-emergence during World War One as Commissioner 
2 See, for example, Roche, S, The Red and the Gold- an informal history of the Waihi Strike, 1912 
OUP 1982, for the 1912 Waihi Strike; Olssen, Erik The Red Feds: revolutionary industrial unionism 
and the New Zealand Federation of Labour, 1908 – 1914. Auckland. Oxford University Press 1988, 
for the 1913 strike, and Binney J, Chaplin G and Wallace C, Mihaia: The Prophet Rua Kenana and 
His Community at Maungapohatu, Oxford University Press, Wellington 1979; and Webster, P. Rua 
and the Maori Millennium, Price Milburn for Victoria University Press, Wellington 1979 for the 1916 
raid on Rua Kenana.
3 King, M, Penguin History of New Zealand, Penguin, Auckland 2003, p. 311
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for Aliens.4  With regard to the Waihi strike, Belich is inclined to attribute much of the 
responsibility for the exceptionally violent civil disturbance to Cullen personally, stating 
that he was ‘unleashed’ on the strikers by Prime Minister Massey, and that he ‘deliberately 
orchestrated confrontations’ between strikers and strikebreakers.5 Chris Trotter’s recent 
and politically partisan history notes Cullen’s central role in the Waihi and 1913 strikes, 
and also in the fatal 1916 raid on Rua Kenana’s community at Maungapohatu.6 He goes 
rather further than Belich in closely linking Cullen with both Massey and his attorney-
general, Alexander Herdman, as the ‘triumvirate’ whose concerted actions crushed the 
1913 strike.7 Trotter finds Cullen of sufficient historical interest to refer to his ‘fearsome 
reputation’ and to suggest that he and Herdman ‘felt justified in sanctioning the murder 
of their fellow citizens’ at Waihi.8 
In more specific histories of the key events in which Cullen took part, his actions are 
examined in greater detail, most recently in the multi-authored history of the 1913 strike 
edited by Melanie Nolan. In a detailed and damning analysis, Richard Hill finds that 
Cullen proved himself, ‘One of the most experienced and successful wielders of police 
coercion in New Zealand history’ and concludes that, ‘The violence of 1913 had escalated 
as a direct result of Cullen’s actions and inactions, as desired by the political executive.’9 
Binney found Cullen directly instrumental in initiating the 1916 raid on Rua Kenana 
in advance of demonstrably illegal activity, of possibly precipitating the gunfight which 
4 Belich, J, Paradise Reforged, Penguin 2001, p. 90-91 (Waihi strike), p. 92-95 (1913 strike), p. 226 
(Commissioner for Aliens)
5 Ibid, p. 90
6 Trotter, Chris, No Left Turn, Random House Auckland, 2007, p. 54 (Waihi strike), p. 84-91 (1913 
strike), p. 112-115 (1916 Maungapohatu raid)
7 Ibid, p. 112
8	 Ibid,	p.	84	(‘fearsome	reputation’),	p.	54	(‘justified	in	sanctioning	the	murder...’)
9 Hill, R, ‘The police, the state, and “lawless law”’, in Nolan M. (ed.) Revolution – the 1913 Great 
Strike in New Zealand, Canterbury University Press 2005, p. 94-95. Note that this book also offers a 
conflicting	view	(Fairburn	M,	‘Interpreting	1913	–	what	are	the	important	questions?’),	arguing	for	
a ‘cock-up’ theory for the causes and conduct of the 1913 strike rather than the deliberate agency of 
key	figures	such	as	Cullen.	I	find	this	argument	less	informed	and	unconvincing.
10
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broke out, and of manipulating evidence at the subsequent criminal trials.10 Webster goes 
further still, stating that “Cullen clearly intended to arrest Rua as part of a show of force”, 
and attributing to him personally the blame for the fatal shooting which followed the 
arrest.11 I contend that his pivotal roles in the above events, and others less well known, 
make Cullen a fitting subject for closer historical study than he has received in the past.
Other significant events and episodes in which Cullen played a major role, such as his 
pursuit of King Country sly-groggers in 1897, of the Northland chief Küao and his 
followers in 1903, and of Dalmatian gumdiggers during World War One; and his one-
man campaign to seed Tongariro National Park with heather, have attracted little previous 
attention from historians and are therefore addressed here in some detail. To date, the 
sole substantial published research into and analysis of Cullen’s political and historical 
significance appears in The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, the second volume of Richard 
Hill’s official police history, and the present study has relied very heavily on this justly 
acclaimed work.12
As an examination of a single prominent individual, structured to follow the course of his 
life and work, and examining the motivations and other factors influencing his actions, 
in many respects this study unavoidably resembles a brief biography. However it is also a 
record of a profession undergoing a profound transformation, and an investigation of the 
part played by a powerful yet relatively little-known figure in some of this country’s most 
dramatic and historically resonant incidents.
10 Binney, Mihaia, p. 89 (planning armed expedition in advance of proving wrongdoing), p. 99 
(possibly	precipitating	gunfight),	p.	103	(manipulating	evidence).
11 Webster, Rua and the Maori Millennium, p. 259
12 Hill, R, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove – the modernisation of policing in NZ 1886-1917, Dun-
more Press/Historical Branch, Dept of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1995
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Chapter one
‘Break them in like horses’ – training and working in the  
Royal Irish Constabulary
This section outlines Cullen’s origins in Ireland, so sharply different from the 
persona he projected in his later years in New Zealand as to suggest that, rather 
than impelling sympathy towards those from similarly deprived backgrounds, 
the limitations of his birth were overcome with a determination and finality 
which drove him subsequently to act with unusual harshness towards the 
poor and otherwise disempowered. Cullen’s training in and service with the 
Royal Irish Constabulary are described in some detail since he transferred 
those experiences largely intact to his adopted country, and exemplified and 
promoted RIC-style policing throughout his career.
The man who would come to head New Zealand’s national police force and take a front-
rank role in some of its most bitterly contested actions was born into profound poverty 
in 1850, in the dying days of Ireland’s ‘Great Hunger’, to a farm labourer named Patrick 
Cullen and his wife Mary. The potatoes and pigs the couple raised on their eight leased 
acres in the village of Glenfarne, County Leitrim, would eventually support eight children, 
and all but the firstborn of these would emigrate. 
The potato famine of 1846–50 devastated Leitrim, one of the least fertile counties in the 
traditionally barren province of Connaught. In the decade to 1851 the population of the 
county dropped by a third, to around 100,000. The Cullens’ smallholding was leased 
from Lord Tottenham whose 14,000-acre estate on the shores of nearby Lough MacNean 
made him one of Leitrim’s largest landowners.13 As the deprivation and disease of the 
Famine lessened and the conditions for small-farmers fractionally improved, expressions 
of hostility towards their landowners became more open, manifested by numerous minor 
13	 Griffith	Sir	R.,	Valuation of the Towns and Townlands of Ireland, vol. 3, Dublin 1857, p. 395
12
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acts of rebellion. Loosely organised groups were active throughout the county, burning the 
hayricks and releasing the cattle of landlords seen as exceptionally unjust. A Leitrim court 
official complained of ‘a gang of able-bodied robbers committing outrages every night’.14 
It was within the context of such a disordered community, with a traditional distrust for 
the machinery of authority, that the young John Cullen would have first encountered the 
daunting officers of the Irish Constabulary. More soldiers than policemen, they patrolled 
the countryside in well-armed, well-drilled parties, their swords, pistols and long rifles 
ready for use against any able-bodied robbers who refused to submit to them. Above all, 
the Constabulary’s role was to resist the rising wave of agrarian outrages committed by 
the hooded gangs of Ribbonmen, Molly Maguires and other rural guerillas, to enforce 
evictions, and defend the property interests of prominent landlords.
The outlawed Fenian nationalist movement also grew secretly but steadily after the 
Famine, and nourished hopes of marshalling the people’s hatred of landlordism into a 
civil war of their own. They harried, threatened and eluded the Constabulary until 1867 
when an uprising in the south of the country failed utterly. The resulting deportations, 
imprisonments and executions brought two decades of relative calm to Ireland, and 
greatly added to the prestige and power of its Constabulary. The prefix ‘Royal’ was added 
to their name by a grateful British sovereign, the force was reformed, modernised and 
enlarged, and it widened its search for likely recruits. Why nineteen-year-old John Cullen 
applied to join two years after the failed rising is not known. As a third son, he had almost 
no prospect of inheriting the lease to his father’s property so his other options for escaping 
a lifetime as a hired labourer were limited to emigration or the regular army. At about 14 
shillings a week, a policeman’s pay was little more than a labourer’s but it was regular, and 
the prospect of accommodation, clothing, promotion and a pension were all powerful 
inducements to enlist. 
14 Leitrim Gazette, 7/3/1861, p. 1
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Joining the RIC
Following his recommendation for recruitment, Cullen applied formally for membership 
of the force at his local police barracks in Manorhamilton. He was there given basic tests 
of general health and fitness and of educational attainment.15 At five feet eight and half 
inches he fractionally exceeded the minimum height requirement, and well fitted the 
desired profile of a barrel-chested single man aged under 27.16 The successful applicant 
next received an order to present himself at Dublin’s Phoenix Park Constabulary Depot. 
There the officers and men of the RIC received a rigorous, intensive and nationally 
consistent training, regarded as so effective that it became the model not only for other 
British police forces but for many countries of the British Empire and beyond. After taking 
the Constabulary oath of office, Cullen, John, service no. 35626, was officially appointed 
to the force on 24 May 1869.17 
The Depot’s spacious buildings and grounds must have appeared palatial to the lad from 
Leitrim, yet his living conditions were spartan. All furniture, clothing and weapons were 
supplied by Ireland’s War Office, and many of the commanding officers came direct 
from military service. In the words of an RIC man who trained there a few years after 
Cullen, “The Depot differed nothing from a military barracks.”18 A reserve force stationed 
at the Depot was designed to rush to any settled part of the country “for the purpose 
of speedily reinforcing the police in cases of sudden and extraordinary emergency”.19 
Recruit training emphasised precision drill and weapons handling, and dauntingly high 
standards of deportment and dress. Every room of the depot was inspected each morning 
and ritually disinfected weekly. The emphasis on cleanliness, says one recruit, was “a kind 
15 Herlihy, J, The Royal Irish Constabulary – a short history and genealogical guide, Dublin, p. 78
16 Royal Irish Constabulary Register extract, Garda Archives/Museum, Dublin Castle
17 Ibid
18	 Farrell,	T,	The Royal Irish Constabulary – a history and personal memoir, University College Dublin 
Press, 2003, p. 8
19 Ibid, p. 7
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of religion”.20 A man who joined the year after Cullen said, “We were then ‘broken in’ on 
much the same principle that country people break in young horses – viz, give them very 
little food, work them hard, and they won’t kick over the traces.”21 Most recruits of this 
period were raw country boys and the Depot commanders imposed on them a regime of 
instant obedience, on-the-double activity and ferocious esprit de corps. 
Cullen was issued with the new Webley six-shot revolver, short-barreled carbine and 
short sword which had recently replaced the pistol, musket and long sword carried by 
the old county Constabularies. The recruits were trained on the lines of a British Army 
light infantry regiment, in manoeuvres such as firing in volleys and the ‘flying wedge’ for 
clearing away a street-fighting mob. Indoor lessons covered police duties such as methods 
for arresting a violent person and subjects aimed at extending their basic education. 
First aid and fire drill were also on the curriculum, since few villages and country towns 
had a fire brigade and when the alarm was sounded the local RIC men were expected 
to act promptly with the materials to hand.22  An important innovation to the training, 
introduced shortly before Cullen’s arrival, was more thorough instruction in the techniques 
of detective investigation. Inspector-General Sir John Stewart Wood “was convinced that 
all policemen should consider detection as a fundamental part of their duties.” 23
After four months of this training (later extended to six), a shy and shambling peasant’s son 
emerged from the Depot an impressive-looking young man, schooled in self-discipline, 
familiar with weaponry and no doubt anxious to put to use all he had learned. However 
he first had to encounter one of the most influential guiding principles of the RIC. To 
avoid any suggestion of favouritism or fraternisation with the public, its members were 
forbidden to serve in their native county or in any other where they had close relatives, 
20	 Jeremiah	Mee,	quoted	in	Griffin,	Brian,	‘The	Irish	Police	1836-1914:	a	social	history’,	PhD	
dissertation, History Dept, Loyola University of Chicago, 1990, p. 33
21 cited in ibid, p. 36
22 Herlihy, The Royal Irish Constabulary, p. 78
23	 Malcolm,	E,	‘Investigating	the	“Machinery	of	Murder”:	Irish	Detectives	and	Agrarian	Outrages’,	
New Hibernia Review, Autumn 2002, p. 90
15
Czar Cullen • Chapter 1
and instead were posted to districts where they knew no-one. As the agents of political 
power in Ireland, it was considered necessary that they be feared by the community, and 
this was easier to achieve in the absence of bonds to family or friends.24 Sub-Constable 
Cullen’s first posting, in August 1869, was to Donegal, just north of his home county and 
one of the wildest, most impoverished and isolated districts in Ireland.25 
24	 	Bridgeman,	Ian,	‘Policing	Rural	Ireland:	a	Study	of	the	Origins,	Development	and	Role	of	the	
Irish Constabulary, and Its Impact on Crime Prevention and Detection in the 19th Century’, PhD 
dissertation, Open University, UK, 1993, p. 170. In the same period, a similar policy existed within 
New Zealand’s Armed Constabulary, closely modeled on the RIC, which held that policemen should 
be	strangers	in	their	districts,	in	order	to	exert	more	effective	and	equitable	control.	See	Hill,	R, The 
Colonial Frontier Tamed: New Zealand Policing in Transition, 1867-1886 Historical Publications 
Branch, Dept of Internal Affairs, Wellington 1989, p. 69
25  Royal Irish Constabulary Register extract, Garda Archives/Museum, Dublin Castle
Donegal
IRELAND
County 
Leitrim
Tyrone
Enniskillen
Dowra
Glenfarne
Dromahair Killargue
Drumkeeran
Tarmon
Ballinagleragh
Aghacashel
Drumshanbo
Keshcarrigan
Leitrim
Drumsna
Mohill
Cloone
Carrigallen
Fenagh
Ballinamore
Annaduff
Dromod
Rookey
Carrick on Shannon
Manorhamilton
Kiltyclogher
BundoranTullaghan
Kinlough
Largydonnell
Rossinver
Lurganboy
Sligo
Longford
Roscommon
Sligo
Fermanagh
Leitrim
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Policing rural Ireland
It is likely that the young sub-constable was first posted to the district headquarters barracks 
in the county’s main town of Letterkenny. The daily barrack routine was strict, tedious 
and unchanging, starting with reveille at 7am and a parade at 8 for the barrack orderly. 
Any off-duty periods, rest days and annual leave were granted only at the discretion of the 
senior barracks officer. Constables were confined to their barracks at night and even off-
duty were expected to wear full uniform and abide by the Constabulary Regulations, which 
set high standards of efficiency, sobriety, cleanliness, morality and general behaviour.26 As 
he became familiar with life under this pattern of draconian discipline and soldierly order, 
John Cullen would have come to realise that his chosen career had not taken account of 
one over-riding factor. Despite the random violence of the Ribbonmen and the ceaseless 
industry of the poteen-makers, policing rural Ireland was essentially a humdrum affair.27 
In the aftermath of the Famine and the failed rising of 1867, civil unrest in the countryside 
had become rare and the overall crime rate was far lower relative to population than in 
England. Every year more young people who might once have taken retribution against a 
vindictive landlord instead departed for the ports of emigration. 
The formidable force built up from the 1830s to counter the rise of nationalism and rural 
disorder had continued to expand after the rate of such offences declined. The expense of 
the police was justified by progressively converting their role from armed intimidators to 
useful servants of the public. From as early as the 1840s, Constabulary officers were given the 
tasks of carrying out Ireland’s ten-yearly census and collecting annual agricultural returns. 
Year by year the list of clerical duties grew, to eventually encompass such dim recesses 
of the bureaucracy as the suppression of cock-fighting, protecting public monuments, 
regulating chimney sweeps and collecting the annual dog licence fee.28 The men’s Phoenix 
26 Bridgeman ‘Policing Rural Ireland…’, p. 183-4
27 Ibid, p. 165
28 Lowe and Malcolm, ‘The Domestication of the Royal Irish Constabulary 1836-1922’ in Irish 
Economic and Social History, XIX (1992) p. 29
17
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Park training had not adequately equipped them for what was, in most circumstances, a 
mundane civil policing role, yet even while inspecting weights and measures or the licence 
of a public house, military bearing was still regarded as important and the daily weapons 
drills and marching formations continued. 
The barrack and its complement were inspected monthly by the District Inspector and 
quarterly by the County Inspector, and these visits could prove terrifying for the barracks 
Men of the RIC, in an Illustrated London News sketch, 11 September 1880
18
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staff and a source of lively entertainment for the public. “I have known a crowd to collect 
around the barracks to hear the abuse given to the men when the officer would come 
there,” sub-constable Micheal Greene told an official inquiry in 1872.29 That inquiry was 
called by a Civil Service Commission in response to the growing number of complaints 
from constables about their pay and conditions. Discontent over low pay was causing 
many policemen to migrate, often to serve in forces in the US, Australia and New 
Zealand. A sub-constable like Cullen still earned just 14 shillings a week in 1872, in spite 
of the burdensome load of administrative duties and the rising cost of living. After the 
Commission’s report, the rate was raised to just above 20 shillings and pro-rated by length 
of service. It was still very low, but it was an indication that the social status of the reviled 
ordinary policeman was at last beginning to improve. 
Few police records from this period have survived and it is not possible to learn how 
Cullen fared under the unrelenting discipline and its system of demerits and breaches. 
There is an indirect indication, however, that he was an exceptional member of the force, 
rewarded with privileges granted to few. In May 1874, less than five years after arriving in 
Donegal, he married a local woman, Rachael McGinley.30 A constable was not normally 
given leave to marry until he had at least seven years’ service, and even then he required 
the permission of his County Inspector and a favourable discipline record. Restrictions 
on marrying had relaxed somewhat by 1874 but even so, for a five-year constable to be 
granted leave to do so indicates that he was held in high standing by his superiors.31 Within 
the next few months the 24-year-old constable and his bride would be required to leave 
Donegal for a county where neither had family connections. They would be required to 
rent accommodation close to Cullen’s new barracks, at their own expense. The newly 
wedded Cullens were condemned to remain in this financial bind for years, since even 
the most promising constables could not win promotion to sergeant without spending 
29	 	Evidence	of	Sub-constable	Micheal	Greene,	Civil	Service	Inquiry,	1872,	cited	in	Bridgeman,	
‘Policing Rural Ireland’, p. 150
30  Hill, R, ‘John Cullen’, DNZB vol. 3, Auckland University Press, 1996, p. 125-127
31  Bridgeman, ‘Policing Rural Ireland…’, p. 155-6
19
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at least ten years in the force. More discouraging still, for an ambitious and capable man 
starting a family, were the prospects for promotion beyond sergeant. As befitted the para-
military nature of the force, RIC officers were a class apart, distinctly separate from the 
men they commanded, and promotion from the ranks was all but unheard of.32 The main 
body of the RIC (Cullen among them) was 75% Catholic, while its officers were 80% 
Protestant.33 This ‘golf-monocle’ section of the force, as it became known, was increasingly 
denounced by Irish newspapers and political leaders for their religious bigotry, arrogance 
and indifference to the needs of both their men and their communities. For men of the 
force who chafed under these conditions, emigration had long been a popular alternative. 
An RIC training was a valuable export commodity in other colonial possessions, and a 
policeman might enjoy conditions and prospects there which he could only dream of 
at home. “You have no idea how comfortable life is after work is over and Sunday to 
himself,” wrote James O’Connell in 1872 from Toronto, where he held the rank of Chief 
Constable.34 Why John and Rachael Cullen chose to travel even further than that in hope 
of bettering themselves is not clear. Family records show that John’s older brother Francis 
also migrated to New Zealand, but which man left first, the family cannot now say. On 
28 April 1876, sub-constable John Cullen resigned from the RIC to emigrate, later saying 
he did so “to seek his fortune in New Zealand”.35 Neither he nor his wife of two years can 
have imagined the scale of the fortune he would find there.  
32  Ibid, p. 141-3
33  Palmer, S, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, p. 537-8
34  Palmer, S, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, p. 537-8
35  Royal Irish Constabulary Register extract, Garda Archives/Museum, Dublin Castle
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Emigration to New Zealand
The Cullens departed the United Kingdom aboard an ideal vessel for transporting 
immigrants, the newly built, relatively roomy and very fast clipper Camperdown.36 She had 
been chartered by the New Zealand government under its programme, begun five years 
earlier, to deliver cheap labour to the booming colony. Migrants with skills in demand 
there could make the three-month voyage for just five pounds apiece, a sum within the 
reach of a frugal policeman. On the passenger list John Cullen reverted to the occupation 
of farm labourer, but at an early stage of the voyage his true calling, or his aptitude for it, 
was detected and he was appointed one of three ship’s constables.37 Each of these received 
£2 for ensuring that the ship’s regulations were followed, that neither its crew nor the 
passengers entered parts of the ship forbidden to them, and that the passengers remained 
orderly and law-abiding. However during the voyage one of the ship’s crew, seaman 
William Mansell, evaded the vigilance of Cullen and the other constables, broke into 
the passengers’ luggage and stole two gold chains and other personal property. Mansell 
received a two-month sentence soon after landing in Wellington.38
36   Evening Post, 10/7/1876
37  Hill, R, background notes to entry on John Cullen in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, held at 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Wellington
38  Evening Post 15/7/1876, 17/7/1876
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On their arrival, assisted migrants like the Cullens were taken to the government 
immigration depot to be accommodated while they found their feet. The depot had been 
converted from a military barracks and even Wellington’s immigration agent admitted 
that by 1876 it was ‘very old and delapidated’.39 For John Cullen, however, the Mount 
Cook depot had one outstanding advantage. This flattened hilltop overlooking the 
harbour, ringed by a defensive wall loopholed for musketry, was also the base for the 
country’s Armed Constabulary, a military-style police force closely modeled on the Royal 
Irish Constabulary. By simply walking across a central parade ground, John Cullen, farm 
labourer, could apply to become Sub-Constable Cullen again. 
Joining the Armed Constabulary
Whether by good fortune or shrewd foresight, Cullen arrived in New Zealand at the right 
time to take advantage of a thorough upheaval of all of the colony’s disparate defence 
and police forces. In the winter of 1876 Wellington’s Mt Cook Barracks was in a ferment 
of transition as the Armed Constabulary reviewed its awkward dual function as both a 
national militia and a regular police force. Formed ten years earlier to maintain order 
following the suppression of insurrectionist North Island Maori, the Constabulary was 
consciously modeled on the RIC and its men carried out near-identical duties as flying-
column soldiers, officers of the law and civil servants on a host of mundane public works. 
In the land battles of the 1860s, the Constabulary’s predecessors had served alongside 
Imperial regiments from Britain. The Mt Cook Barracks had been erected as the Wellington 
headquarters for the 65th Yorkshire regiment and after its return to Yorkshire in 1865, the 
solidly built single-story wooden buildings were taken over by the Armed Constabulary.40 
An 1870s photograph shows the Constabulary men drilling at the Depot, white bandoliers 
across their tunics, rifles at parade rest. In relatively peaceful times this picture of martial 
readiness was inappropriate and the government was determined to convert a large section 
of the Constabulary into a less expensive force for mainly civil duties.
39	 	Annual	report	of	the	Immigration	Officer,	Wellington,	New Zealand Mail, 19/8/1876, p. 15
40  Spyve, PJ, The Barracks on the Hill – a history of the army’s presence at Mt Cook, Wellington, 1840-
1979, Army General Staff, 1982 p. 30-31
Mt Cook Depot, Wellington, 1870s
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At the same time 30 years of haphazard policing by forces employed by each of the 
country’s half-dozen provincial governments was also coming to an end. The public 
reputation of the various provincial forces varied widely and at their worst they were a 
drunken, incompetent, ill-paid laughing-stock. New Zealand’s population had doubled 
in the past decade, the provincial system of government was being dismantled and the 
colony, it was generally agreed, now needed a well trained and adequately paid national 
police force, capable of maintaining order through the consent of the public rather than 
by crass coercion. By 1876 it was apparent that the Armed Constabulary would soon 
absorb the various provincial forces, and that its civil and military functions would be 
more differentiated. This was an opportune moment for a man with RIC training and a 
clean record to offer his services, and these were formally accepted on 20 July 1876, when 
Cullen was appointed constable no. 645.41 
His weaponry and other equipment were already familiar, as all recruits were drilled in 
the use of the Snider rifle and Webley revolver. Just two years later much of this firearms 
training would become redundant when, in a move towards demilitarisation, foot police 
lost the right to carry arms and ammunition. Cullen was once again placed in the Phoenix 
Park situation of undergoing military-style training which did not prepare him for the 
41  Police Gazette August 1876, p. 81, P 12/9 Archives NZ
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duties he was expected to carry out. Performing essential public works for no extra pay 
was an established Constabulary tradition, the more so when there were no longer Maori 
to fight, and in 1876 a third of the force was deployed in making and repairing roads 
and bridges.42 At the end of their three-month training Constabulary recruits sat an 
examination to determine whether they would be taken on as permanent members of the 
force. Only the most promising were selected for direct entry to the Police Branch, and 
Cullen was one of these. In late January 1877 he received orders to report to Blenheim, 
headquarters of the Nelson-Marlborough Provincial police, the first Armed Constabulary 
man in the country to be appointed to a Provincial force.43 
42  Annual report of Commissioner of Armed Constabulary, New Zealand Mail, 12/8/1876
43  Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 336
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Chapter two 
‘More akin to persecution than prosecution’ – policing 19th-century NZ
The early years of Cullen’s New Zealand police career are here outlined, with 
a focus on the events and actions which precipitated his rapid rise through 
the ranks and those foreshadowing later key events. The nature of his work is 
briefly described to indicate some of the occupational issues which he would 
later be required to address as Commissioner. Special emphasis is placed on his 
fortuitous 1897 raid on sly-groggers in the King Country, which propelled him 
to the rank of Inspector and head of the country’s largest and most important 
police district.
Policing the provinces
Blenheim proved to be an incendiary town. Just two months before Cullen’s arrival, the 
Government buildings which housed the police office, lockup and constable’s quarters were 
destroyed by an arsonist, forcing the local police to live and work in cramped temporary 
premises.44 These quarters were far from ideal but Inspector Emerson, in charge of the 
district and 14 years Cullen’s senior, was prepared to live under the same roof as his men 
and whatever prisoners were held in the totally inadequate lockup. However Emerson’s 
superior, Superintendent Weldon, was appalled by such conditions while on an inspection 
visit of his South Island stations. He was accustomed to regard Inspectors of Constabulary 
as gentlemen, he said, and “I have… yet to learn that they should avail themselves of 
house accommodation built for a needy class of people.”45  Inspector Emerson was soon 
transferred to Tauranga, for no other reason, said the Marlborough newspaper, than that, 
“the place where he mostly sleeps is less than some others”.46
44	 ‘Blenheim	police	offices’,	compiled	from	records	made	available	by	AM	Hale,	Blenheim	public	
library
45 cited in Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 301
46 Marlborough Express, 10/7/1878
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On Emerson’s transfer, Cullen was placed in charge of the Blenheim station and followed 
the daily rounds of the small-town constable, rattling the locks of shops, dispatching 
the occasional drunk to the cells and appearing in court to give evidence on his arrests. 
Attention to these duties won him his first promotion, to second-class constable, within 
six months of arriving in Blenheim. He would distinguish himself there several times as 
an athletic and quick-thinking officer of the law. The first occasion came during his first 
winter in the town when he saved a stable from destruction by fire. His prompt action won 
him praise from his superiors and a further promotion.47 This was rapid advancement but 
it was soon overshadowed. In December 1877 children’s shouting alerted Cullen that a 
small boy had fallen into the swift-flowing river running through the town. He waded 
in and carried ashore the small body, “apparently lifeless, the flesh being quite blue and 
the eyes closed.” Within minutes, however, the boy regained consciousness and proved 
unharmed. Praise for this act of undoubted heroism was duly forthcoming, both from the 
parents of the little boy and from Cullen’s superiors who awarded him five pounds, the 
first of many such rewards he would receive.48
There are occasional shadows over this otherwise exemplary early career, hints that at 
times Cullen displayed a zeal which some found excessive. Not long after arriving in 
Blenheim he arrested a mail deliverer named Kells for tampering with his mailbags. The 
Express thought the case, “raises concern that it should ever have been brought to Court. 
Although Mr Kells was swiftly, and rightly, acquitted of the charge, the manner of his 
treatment seems more akin to persecution than prosecution.”49 The following year, under 
the headline ‘Police officiousness’, the paper castigated Cullen for arresting visitors to the 
town on a charge of failing to keep their horses under proper control. The defendants 
strongly disputed Cullen’s evidence and a correspondent to the paper supported them. 
“One of our oldest and most respected settlers was placed in the degraded position of 
defendant in a court of law…. That the police should be permitted to annoy visitors to 
your town, appears to me something intolerable.”50
47  Ibid, 22/8/1877
48  Ibid, 5/12/1877, Police Gazette, 17/12/1877, p. 88
49  Marlborough Express, 18/6/1877
50  Ibid, 25/11/1878
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Despite such misgivings, by the age of 28 Cullen bore on his right sleeve the single chevron 
of a third-class sergeant, representing a stellar career for a man just two years in the 
country.51 He was also the father of two-year-old Mary, the couple’s first surviving child, 
who would eventually be joined by no less than ten younger siblings. The Cullen family 
would have struggled economically on a sergeant’s salary of eight shillings a day, since no 
extra allowance was made for a married man, or, when transferred, for the added expenses 
of his wife and children.52 In the first of a string of undoubtedly wearisome transfers, the 
growing family was relocated to the nearby community of Renwick, where Cullen held sole 
charge as a rural mounted sergeant. By this time the economic problems evident during 
his training in Wellington had worsened into a genuine depression. Across much of the 
country unemployment was rising and wages falling, and the police were not immune from 
the government’s efforts to slash its burden of administration costs. Cullen’s pay was cut 
back by sixpence a day although he kept his job, unlike dozens of other Constabulary men. 
In a further move to keep the force’s numbers down, promotion was granted strictly on the 
basis of seniority rather than merit. This would slow, but not stall, Cullen’s methodical rise 
through the three ranks of constables and the three more of sergeants. 
Less than a year after arriving at Renwick he was transferred to Havelock in the Marlborough 
Sounds, and just months later received instructions to pack yet again, this time for a 
more important posting to the southern city of Dunedin.53 Superintendent Weldon, who 
had been so dismayed at the temporary police accommodation in Blenheim, was still in 
command in that substantial city of 26,000 people. Here the depression was particularly 
severe and the level and types of crime were new to a man unfamiliar with urban policing. 
Welfare services for the destitute amounted to little more than soup kitchens, to be 
without legitimate means of support was a crime, and ‘nests of vagrants’ kept Weldon’s 
men busy. Towards the end of 1881 these routine offences were overshadowed by an affair 
of national significance. One October day Dunedin central police station was thronged 
with volunteers bristling to take part in the military raid on the defiant Maori leader 
Te Whiti’s pacifist community of Parihaka in Taranaki. Weldon selected a group of forty 
51  Police Gazette, 17/7/1878, p. 98
52  Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 307
53  Marlborough Express, 10/1/1881, 24/5/1881
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from among the crowd of hopefuls. The Otago Daily Times thought them “a fine-looking 
lot of men,” and noted that the ‘citizen soldiers’ were given a huge send-off at the railway 
station.54 Sergeant Cullen (as he now was), while remaining behind, must have followed 
with interest news of the role played by the volunteer troops in arresting Te Whiti and 
breaking up his community. This example of deploying a large body of volunteers to help 
regular forces overcome organised dissent would not be lost on him. 
 
The following year found the Sergeant and his family installed in quarters beside the 
new bluestone barracks at Timaru. Here Cullen was the senior officer of the town, and 
found that economic hardships added inexorably to the crime rate. The police developed 
terms for such particularly petty thefts as ‘snow-dropping’, the theft of bedlinen from 
clotheslines. The children of the poor were often held in jail, less out of Victorian attitudes 
to punishment than from a lack of alternatives. On one occasion Cullen opposed bail for a 
boy aged about ten charged with stealing a handcart, on the grounds that both his parents 
were working away from home and he had no safe place to live. The magistrate accepted 
this remorseless argument and little James Wells was put between the shafts of his stolen 
property and hauled it to the police cell where he was to spend the next several days.55 Along 
with general unemployment, the police force’s own numbers shrank as the government cut 
its law enforcement budget further. The police regulations introduced in 1877 prevented 
men from leaving their barracks or going more than a quarter of a mile from their station 
without the permission of an officer, and this military-style discipline would remain the 
pattern for the next 30 years. Unsurprisingly, the force was discontented and there were 
frequent rumblings that promotion was due to favouritism, and of corruption among senior 
officers. Cullen reinforced this latter charge. In 1885, he stated later, he was transferred 
from Timaru at three weeks’ notice because he was “pretty successful” at stopping illegal 
Sunday drinking in the pubs. A lawyer acting for local publicans said his clients had gone 
directly to the Police Commissioner to have Cullen removed from the town. “It was pretty 
well known,” Cullen claimed, that this is why he was shifted back to Dunedin.56 
54  Otago Daily Times, 22/10/1881, 24/10/1881
55  Daily Telegraph, 21/12/1893
56	 Evidence	of	John	Cullen,	‘Report	and	evidence	of	Royal	Commission	on	Police	Force	in	New	
Zealand’, AJHR H2 1898, p. 577, line 805
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The rigidly upright sergeant clashed repeatedly with his less scrupulous superior officer 
on his next posting, to the port city of Napier, a sub-district of the newly restructured 
Waikato and East Coast District.57 As a second-class Sergeant with a family of five 
children he took charge of the town’s police force under the overall control of a district 
Inspector based at Hamilton. For some years this was his old colleague from Blenheim, 
the now aged and erratic Inspector Emerson. Cullen frowned on gambling and never 
drank in a public house, but Emerson apparently did both during his tours of inspection, 
conduct which his sergeant thought was “not such as to maintain discipline in the Force 
and command respect”.58 Far worse were Emerson’s close and friendly relations with 
spielers, a class of men which Secretary of Labour Edward Tregear said “vibrates between 
that of the loafer and the criminal”.59 Cullen encountered a “well-organised gang of 
expert thieves, technically known as spielers” in 1889. He was able to secure convictions 
against this gang, but encountered others who exerted a mysterious influence over his 
fellow officers. In 1892 a police detective named Kirby arrived in Napier and from that 
date, claimed Cullen, “spielers flocked here…. I made efforts to suppress them but was 
not successful.” He charged two of the worst with lacking lawful means of support and 
conducted the prosecution himself. Detective Kirby, however, testified that the men 
were earning an honest living, while Inspector Emerson sat beside the men’s lawyer 
throughout the trial and appeared to prompt him. The case was dismissed.60 Kirby, 
however, long considered ‘a disgrace to the force’, was arrested some years later for 
extortion and eventually jailed for three years.61
57 Hill, Iron Hand…p. 18
58	 Evidence	of	John	Cullen,	‘Report	and	evidence	of	Royal	Commission	on	Police	Force	in	New	
Zealand’, AJHR H2 1898, p. 908, line 85
59	 E.	Tregear,	quoted	in	Clausen,	I,	‘Crime	and	Criminals	in	Dunedin,	1880-1893’	research	essay,	Otago	
University 1983, p. 51
60	 Evidence	of	John	Cullen,	‘Report	and	evidence	of	Royal	Commission	on	Police	Force	in	New	
Zealand’, AJHR H2 1898, p. 906-907
61 Hill, Iron Hand…p. 56
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On top of these extreme frustrations, Sergeant Cullen was working from eight am 
until midnight to carry out the myriad of non-policing tasks still expected of men in 
his position. While stationed in Napier he served as Registrar of Electors, Inspector of 
Factories and Inspector of Weights and Measures, all at no extra pay.62 By the time his 
seven years in Napier were up Cullen sported the three chevrons of a first-class sergeant, 
the highest rank he could have expected to attain in the RIC, but by no means the limit 
of his ambition in his new country.
Despite his reputation for toughness and unbending rectitude, Cullen’s next appointment, 
to take charge of the Wanganui sub-district in 1894, was initially greeted with dismay in 
that city. Its citizens made it clear that they preferred John Bell Thomson, the current 
district Inspector based to the north in New Plymouth. Their objections lay not with 
Cullen himself but with Te Whiti, the Parihaka leader who had been arrested in 1881 with 
the help of volunteer troops from as far afield as Dunedin, but was now released from 
custody and quietly rebuilding his community. His return so concerned the people of New 
Plymouth that they insisted that their trusted Police Inspector remain close by. Under such 
circumstances, conceded the Wanganui Herald, Cullen “is the next best man… a first-
class sergeant, an excellent all-round officer, a strict disciplinarian, has plenty of tact… we 
have no doubt he will at once set to work and place our local police force in a thorough 
state of efficiency.”63 This was no small task. The Wanganui police were described as 
‘utterly demoralised’ at the time of Cullen’s arrival, yet they faced heavy and immediate 
challenges.64 Within weeks of taking up his post Cullen dispatched Mounted Constable 
Hewett by steamer up the river to Pipiriki to serve summonses on three ‘natives’ who were 
obstructing the building of new European settlements.65 In court the defendants asserted 
their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi, and won an acquittal.66 Similar cases against 
upper-river Maori would recur throughout Cullen’s time in Wanganui, an indication 
62  MacDonald, CH, The Story of the Napier Police District, 1886-1986, Napier and Hastings Police 
Clubs 1986, p. 20
63  Wanganui Herald, 17/2/1894
64  Wanganui Chronicle, 17/2/1894, editorial
65  Ibid, 22/3/1894
66  Ibid, 24/04/1894
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that the remoter reaches of his district were one of several surviving pockets of ‘rival 
sovereignty’ in New Zealand.67  In these ‘Native places difficult of access’, Maori persisted 
to varying extent in resisting the imposition of Pakeha justice.68
In 1898, after five years as the town’s police sergeant, Cullen carried out an undercover 
action which would make him a nationally known figure and propel him to new heights 
within the police force. Until this point he had been a highly competent but not an 
inspired policeman. His conservative, rigidly disciplined attitudes enabled him to outlast 
peers who succumbed to bribe-taking or fell foul of their superiors. He had so far avoided 
such downfalls and been rewarded with steadily increasing authority, but his greatest 
achievements and failures still lay ahead of him. 
Combatting sly-grogging in the King Country
Year after year throughout Cullen’s time in Wanganui, sly-grogging proved an incessant 
problem and a losing battle. He and his parties of constables relentlessly pursued Sunday 
traders, illicit distillers and after-hours drinkers, often convicting the same offenders over 
and over again. Most of their trouble in this regard came from the small timber-milling 
settlement of Karioi in the north of his district. Karioi lay just within the tribal boundary 
of the King Country ‘dry area’, where, by special proclamation, no alcohol at all could 
be legally sold. It was a prohibition more honoured in the breach than the observance, 
an unending source of futile effort by police and a joke and sport to residents. It was to 
provide Cullen with a coup which would greatly accelerate his career.
 Under the terms of the proclamation only the sale of liquor was banned, not its possession 
or consumption, and gaining a conviction required the sworn evidence of two witnesses, a 
requirement that the few policemen in the district found practically impossible to fulfill.69 
Observers noted that more liquor was consumed in the region, with more disastrous 
67  Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 326
68	 	Defence	Minister,	1884,	quoted	in	ibid, p. 331
69  NZ Herald, 8/5/1903, p. 6
King Country town c. 1896. Alexander	Turnbull	Library		–	Price	Collection
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results for the Maori population, than in regions where no prohibition applied. The 
flow of alcohol into the territory became a torrent once the acres locked up in native 
ownership were finally freed for European sale.70 By the mid-1890s, public drunkenness 
in the King Country had become a national scandal. In June 1896 the Minister of Justice 
received a letter describing some its effects. “… there are often a score of people drunk and 
disorderly in Te Kuiti… this state of affairs leads to gross immorality .. drunken Maori 
women and girls are a common sight there, and the results generally so far as regards the 
Maori population, are most deplorable”.71 It was a letter the Minister could not easily 
ignore as it was signed by five of the King Country’s more prominent European residents, 
and since the temperance movement was baying for blood over widespread allegations 
that the police were conniving with sly-groggers. “It is openly said in the district that the 
police have instructions from headquarters not to interfere with the business.”72 
This was an allegation widely and often justifiably made of the police, but it was an unfair 
charge to throw at Constable Charles Stanyer who, together with native constable Te 
Hoponi, were the only police to regularly cover the vast King Country district. 73 The 
70  NZ Herald, 24/10/1895, p. 4; evidence of GT Wilkinson, AJHR, 1898 H-2, p. 1047, line 32
71	 	GT	Wilkinson	et	al	to	Minister	of	Justice,	25/6/1896,	quoted	in	AJHR, 1898 H-2, p. 1137
72  ibid.
73  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 32-36
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two uniformed men stood no chance against a network of locals who informed on them 
wherever they rode, the sly-groggers often having faster horses and better knowledge of 
shortcuts.74 The obvious strategy was to adopt the use of plainclothes, and it was one the 
police had resorted to many times in the past, in spite of official misgivings. Although 
Cullen’s RIC experience had emphasised the suppression rather than the detection 
of crime, he is likely to have had some contact with plainclothes sleuths in Ireland. In 
time, according to one historian of the RIC, “a suit of plain clothes was considered as 
indispensable a part of a policeman’s uniform as his baton or uniform.”75 The two King 
Country officers, however, were too well known to their quarry to resort to such tactics. 
Instead, in August 1896 a pair of swagmen arrived in Te Kuiti on the weekly train and 
spent three weeks in town. Within days, however, practically everyone knew the two 
ostensible swaggers to be policemen sent down from Auckland. John Ellis, a local farmer 
and one of those who had written the June letter to the Minister of Justice, believed the 
men’s disguise was seen through even before they arrived. Auckland’s Inspector Hickson, 
responsible for arranging this feeble entrapment effort, acknowledged that locals had been 
warned of it in advance, probably by telegram sent on ahead by railways staff.76 The five 
leading citizens wrote again to the Justice Minister, advising that his first move had been 
a complete failure and that the sly-grogging menace was worse than ever. A second and 
more carefully planned effort at entrapment began.77
In mid-1898 a Detective Herbert, in plain clothes, spent two months in the King Country 
familiarising himself with the places and people where a man might buy something 
stronger than lemonade. At that point, on a night in August 1898, a stiff-backed insurance 
agent stepped off the Auckland train at Te Kuiti and made for Hetet’s hotel. In clipped 
Irish tones he introduced himself as Mr Berkely, a canvassing agent for the newly formed 
74  Evidence of Charles Stanyer, AJHR 1898 H2 p. 1015, line 612
75	 	Griffin,	B,	‘The	Irish	Police	1836-1914’,	p.	395
76  Evidence of Insp. Hickson, AJHR, 1898 H-2, p. 1006, line 279 et passim
77  Evidence of Const. Stanyer, ibid, p. 1016; Evidence of JW Ellis, ibid, p. 1031-2
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Government Insurance Company. This deception was devastatingly effective. In just 30 
hours in the King Country Sergeant Cullen, alias Berkely, together with Constable Stanyer, 
Detective Herbert and seven informers and witnesses, succeeded in finding evidence 
against 23 sly-groggers, who were eventually convicted of almost 60 separate offences. 
Twelve were sentenced to prison without the option of a fine, the fines and costs of the 
remainder amounting to over 600 pounds. Of this impressive sum, over 50 pounds was 
later paid out in rewards to the ten men involved in the raid, Cullen himself pocketing 20 
pounds, one of the largest rewards paid out to a police officer at that time.78
The prohibitionists exulted in this outcome and heaped praise on Cullen in particular. 
Other voices, including the five men whose original letters had prompted the two raids, were 
less enthusiastic. Later that year the Minister received a further letter from them advising 
that “the (sly-grog) trade is still being pushed almost as busily as ever”.79 Others were 
disturbed at the precedent these covert tactics might create. Constable Stanyer admitted 
that in order to secure the convictions, Cullen “had to adopt a good many expressions that 
were not true”.80 The NZ Herald editorialised that the Inspector (as Cullen soon became) 
“had to resort to various stratagems that would not pass muster in a court of morality… 
Are we to understand that the Commissioner of the Government Insurance Department 
authorised the temporary employment of Inspector Cullen…? If so, then the Department 
has degraded itself, to the injury of its business. It is not the function of the Department 
to afford facilities for the detection of breaches of the liquor laws.”81
In its annual report to Parliament the next year the Police Commissioner awkwardly 
acknowledged that, “The police, after using all ordinary methods, have had recourse to a 
system which is strongly condemned by many persons: We refer to a system of deception… 
We are aware there are some cases which may justify its use, but express the hope that it 
78  Evidence of Const. Stanyer, ibid, p. 1016
79  Evidence of A. Hume, ibid, p. 1140 line 41
80  Evidence of Charles Stanyer, AJHR, 1989 H-2, p. 1017
81  NZ Herald 18/7/1898, p. 4
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will never become a recognised police system in this colony.”82 In fact, the greatest single 
result of ‘Mr Berkely’s’ efforts, once they became public knowledge through the trial of 
the sly-groggers concerned, was to make Cullen a nationally known name. He was shortly 
promoted to the silver braid of an Inspector’s uniform and put in charge of the Westland 
and Nelson districts, the site of his first posting. He was 47 years old, and already holding 
a higher rank than a lifetime in the RIC might have secured him.
For much of 1896 Inspector Cullen was also put in temporary charge of the Christchurch 
district to support the work of a commission of inquiry into, among other matters, the 
same covert operation he had recently carried out. Public claims of police collusion with 
sly-groggers had snowballed into wider allegations that the force in general was riddled 
with corruption, and that police were not the moral guardians in their communities they 
were expected to be. For several months a three-man Royal Commission, including a 
temperance leader, toured the country hearing evidence from policemen of all ranks 
and from others with knowledge considered relevant to the inquiry’s terms. Cullen was 
interviewed several times, speaking guardedly about his now-discredited senior officer, 
the intemperate Inspector Emerson, and with characteristic bluntness about the men 
under his command. The policemen of the day, he felt, were neither as strong physically 
nor as intelligent as in the past.83 A staunch conservative increasingly at odds with his own 
men, Cullen told the Commission that he believed in maintaining the disenfranchisement 
of police officers and their wives, a condition of employment which was a relic of its 
origins as a para-military force and had since become widely unpopular among the police. 
However popularity among the men under his command was seldom sought by Cullen, 
and he preferred instead to cultivate the approval of leading political figures who admired 
his uncompromising severity and saw it as grounds for his further advancement.
82  Annual Report of Police Commissioner, AJHR 1898 H-2 p. xxiii. This was a notably futile 
expectation	and	the	deployment	of	disguised	officers	became	steadily	more	common,	especially	to	
detect	liquor	offences.	See	for	example,	Hill,	Iron Hand… p. 207. (In Taihape, 1907) ‘Nearly every 
stranger standing about the vigilant constable’s height is closely scrutinised to make sure he is not 
[Constable] Baker in disguise.’
83 Evidence of Insp. Cullen, AJHR 1898 H-2 p. 730-733, 919-921
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Chapter three 
‘A smart and vigilant officer’ – policing early 20th-century Northland
Cullen’s tenure as the Auckland-Northland district Inspector is traced, as an example 
of the major issues facing the police force nationally and for the insight provided 
into his personality and methods of operation, which would later mark his career as 
Commissioner and seal his reputation. In particular, a remarkable but little known 
1903 armed police action on a Northland Maori community is described in some detail, 
since this bears several close similarities with the 1916 raid in the Urewera with which 
Cullen’s name is today perhaps most closely associated.
Taking charge in Auckland
The tenant-farmer’s son from Glenfarne was now a man of some substance, with a 
nationwide reputation for rigid probity, friends in the upper echelons of government and 
the opportunity to indulge his enthusiasm for hunting and horse-racing. Even greater 
prominence was not long in coming. At the end of 1896 he was placed in charge of the 
largest, most turbulent and most populous Inspectorate in the country, the Auckland, 
Waikato and Northern police district. “The fact that Inspector Cullen has been appointed 
to the permanent charge of the Auckland police district,” pronounced the NZ Freelance, 
“will afford general satisfaction in this community. Since he relieved Inspector Hickson 
some six months ago he has been vigorously engaged in clearing out the Augean stable, 
and has given frequent proof that he is a smart, vigilant, and wide-awake officer who will 
stand no nonsense, and is determined to keep his men fully abreast of their duties.”84
Another magazine featured a cover portrait of the ramrod-backed and black-moustached 
Inspector at his desk in the brand-new and purpose-built district headquarters in 
84  NZ Freelance, 31/12/1898, p. 5
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Auckland’s Symonds St, by far the best equipped of any police station in New Zealand.85 
For a renowned martinet like Cullen, such generous working conditions were an indication 
of his determination to improve standards throughout the force. In its report on the 
new Symonds St district headquarters, the Auckland Weekly News could announce with 
satisfaction that, “the morale and discipline of the force is greatly improved of late, the 
political element having been greatly reduced, if not wholly extinguished.”86 The ‘political 
element’ was the disaffected section who felt their pay and conditions were still inadequate 
and who chafed under its rigid rules. It was their agitation for improvement which was 
described as ‘the Augean stable’ upon Cullen’s appointment to head the district. 
Now that his men had a state-of-the-art barracks, their new Inspector was not inclined to 
further pampering. His annual report for 1903 complained that:
“some of the junior men have not conducted themselves as well as they 
ought. Some of the returned troopers and ex-Artillery men have not given 
satisfaction in either their conduct or the manner in which they discharge their 
duties, there being an evident desire to shirk their duties and responsibilities 
as much as possible. There is also a noticeable tendency on the part of some 
of the younger men to report themselves sick and thereby enjoy a few days’ 
rest, when there is really very little the matter with them.”87
Such self-indulgence would not do in a booming port city where active crowd control 
might be called for. In 1902, at the end of the Boer War, a thousand British troops 
demonstrated the might of the Empire in a parade up Queen St. That splendid display was 
eclipsed six years later by the arrival of the United States’ ‘Great White Fleet’. Aucklanders 
crammed vantage points around the harbour to watch the 16 heavily armoured warships 
steam into port. Aside from such occasional spectacles, day-to-day policing in the city 
was relatively routine. Cullen had told the 1897 Royal Commission on policing that in his 
85 NZ Graphic, 11/5/1907, p. 1
86 Auckland Weekly News, 9/2/1900, p. 4
87 Annual report of Insp. J Cullen, AJHR 1903 H-16, p. 5
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view the populace of his West Coast district “are very orderly and very law-abiding, as a 
whole”. This tended to be borne out during his term in Auckland and his annual reports 
refer mainly to the prevalence of illegal gambling on the city’s streets and shadier places of 
business and pleasure such as professional boxing rings.88 
However the district under his command covered 60 police stations spread across the King 
Country and the Thames and Coromandel goldfields, and from Tauranga to North Cape, 
staffed by a total of 120 regular police and a further 20 special (that is, volunteer) constables 
and ‘native’ constables. These latter could sometimes prove very valuable in settlements 
beyond the reach of formed roads, where Mäori was often the only language spoken.
The capture of Chief Ku-ao 
In early 1903 Cullen began receiving reports from constables in the north of his far-
flung district of a disturbance beyond their own powers to control. In a remote Mäori 
community near the northern town of Kaikohe, a traditionalist chief named Iraia Küao of 
Ngäti Moerewa was alarming his Päkehä neighbours with incendiary speeches threatening 
violence to those of his people planning to sell their tribal lands, and to the surveyors 
preparing to establish property boundaries for individual title. In his encounter with 
Küao Cullen would confront a personality as forceful as his own, and a disaffected people 
of whom at that time he knew very little.  
His arrival in the colony some years after the bitter Mäori insurgencies of the 1860s 
meant that Cullen had little occasion to deal directly with Mäori as a group, rather 
than as individual offenders. In the aftermath of those wars, surviving Mäori leaders 
had retreated to secluded settlements where they and their followers could continue to 
maintain a largely traditional way of life, speaking their own language and having little 
contact with outsiders. They were rarely troubled by police so long as they refrained from 
88  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 64-5 (Remana Hi), p. 134-7 (‘Dog TaxWar’)
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threatening the economic life of the colony. However the years preceding Cullen’s term 
as Inspector had seen several encounters between armed police and Mäori in remote, 
practically roadless and predominantly Mäori Northland communities, such as an 1887 
raid on followers of the ‘prophetess’ Remana Hi near Okaihau, and the 1898 ‘Dog Tax 
War’ in the Hokianga.89 A similar threat had now appeared nearby, in Chief Küao’s tiny 
and very isolated community of Tautoro, a few miles from Kaikohe. 
Kaikohe’s police constable Tim Cahill reported to Cullen that at a sitting of the Native Land 
Court, the fiery Ngäpuhi chief had spoken out against some of his followers who wished to 
have their lands transferred from tribal to individual ownership, thus giving them the right 
to lease or sell the land. In particular Küao resented the presence of surveyors on his ancestral 
lands on the grounds that the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in his own lifetime, entitled the chief 
alone to determine the boundaries of his people’s lands.90 The heart of Küao’s territory, and 
the site of his pä, was a steep conical hill named Tauanui, a perfect inverted cone, evidence of 
a long-ago eruption. Constable Cahill described how, in early 1903, Küao stood on Tauanui 
and pointed out the traditional boundaries of every property which the families in his tribe 
could claim as their own. Cahill noted that the families whose blocks were so demarcated “all 
agreed to this and were quite satisfied with the portion given to them”. Küao, said Constable 
Cahill, “thinks no-one has a right to deal with the land except himself. He does not recognise 
the law in the matter.”91  In a series of increasingly angry confrontations the old chief defied 
the local block committee appointed to ratify the traditional boundaries. At a Native Land 
Court hearing in Kaikohe in April 1903, he made his ultimatum. If the landowners allowed 
him to partition the land himself, said the old chief, all would be well. If not, “Ka ara he 
pakanga” (I will cause trouble and kill). “I have no more to say,” he told Court president 
Edward Blomfield, who was also the local magistrate. “I will ask Timi Kara (Native Minister 
James Carroll) to come and discuss the matter with me.”92
89  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 64-65 (Remana Hi), p. 134-6 (‘Dog Tax War’)
90  Const. T Cahill to Inspector Cullen, Auckland, 2/5/1903, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
91  Ibid
92  NZ Herald, 25/04/03
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Anxious to defuse the dispute, James Carroll agreed to travel from Wellington to Kaikohe 
and Inspector Cullen proposed to accompany him “with whatever force he requires”.93 
This offer of a high-level police escort was declined by Carroll who, as a Mäori himself, 
understood the risk of provoking a hostile reaction from the local people. He chose 
instead to be accompanied only by a pair of plainclothes constables.94 The party arrived at 
Kaikohe to “a large and influential gathering of natives” where the Minister urged Küao 
to abide by the Native Land Court’s ruling. Again the old chief rejected this challenge to 
his mana, and returned to his community at Tautoro, where his supporters were said 
to number about a hundred.95 Tension in the district was now rising, and Magistrate 
Blomfield swore in four Mäori special constables to keep him advised of developments. 
Cullen also instructed Ohaeawai’s part-time District Constable ‘Wiri’ King and Native 
Constable Beazley, both fluent in Mäori, to report on the stirrings at Tautoro. Ever since 
the days of the Land Wars the sale of arms to ‘unfriendly natives’ had been a perennial 
source of anxiety to the police and a key task of its detective branch.96 Constable Cahill was 
ordered by telegram to “let discreet endeavours be made to ascertain the number of arms 
and particulars of same possessed by Kuao and his followers... ”.97
Cullen received the result of these ‘discreet endeavours’ in mid-May 1903:
“So far I have been informed that they are in possession of seventy-five arms 
consisting of sixty-one ordinary shotguns and nine rifles, also fifty revolvers... 
I know they got no warlike stores at Kaikohe as I have taken all precaution that 
they should receive none”.98
93  Insp. Cullen to Commissioner of Police, 24/4/03, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
94  Ibid, 27/04/03
95  T. Cahill, to Insp. Cullen, 2/5/1903, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
96  Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 48
97  Insp. Cullen to Const. T. Cahill, 20/5/1903, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
98  Const. T. Cahill to Insp. Cullen, 30/6/1903, ibid
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Cullen passed on this assurance to the Police Commissioner, Walter Dinnie, at the same time 
absolving himself and his men of any negligence in permitting this situation to develop: 
“I am quite satisfied that whatever Arms te Kuao’s people may possess have 
been purchased by Pakeha Maoris, ostensibly for themselves, and then quietly 
taken to the Native settlement and handed over to the Natives. As there are no 
restrictions placed on Europeans procuring arms and ammunition for their own 
use, no notice would be taken of their purchase.” 
Dinnie was advised that,
“the position taken up by Kuao in connection with this land dispute is one 
from which he cannot now recede without great loss of “mana”… hence there 
is a probability that he will resort to violence when the members of the native 
committee meet at Kaikohe in September next.”99
As the date of that meeting approached, rumours of target practice, fortified firing positions 
and powerful, modern weaponry flew around the Kaikohe district. A visitor to Tautoro, 
“saw in Kuao’s whare [house] about 30 guns and about same number of followers…” 
Constable Cahill himself visited the isolated settlement, surrounded by dense native bush, 
and “Found it deserted, searched for supposed rifle pits, none there... Europeans getting 
alarmed here without protection, they think Kuao and followers may come into township 
any time and resort to violence”.100 Never one to shrink from a confrontation, Cullen was 
nonetheless cautious about how best to proceed. Küao’s remote bush settlement could 
only be approached by men in single file and a direct assault, he thought, would require 
a large force of well-armed troops, as “we would have to contend with the full strength of 
his followers, women included.”101 Cullen later estimated that it would have required 500 
police and soldiers to overwhelm the fortified settlement. A subtler tactic was called for.
99  Insp. Cullen to Comm. Dinnie, 11/7/1903, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
100  Const. T. Cahill to Insp. Cullen, 3/9/1903, P 1/273, ibid.
101  Insp. Cullen to Comm. Dinnie, 5/9/1903, ibid.
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The Inspector’s sources in the district had already informed him that the Rarawa chief 
Heremia Te Wake (father of the 1975 Maori Land March leader Whina Cooper) had been 
endeavouring to mediate in the dispute. Two days before the fateful September meeting, 
Te Wake and his people were due to meet Küao and his leading followers at Kaikohe in 
a last-ditch attempt at a peaceable resolution. Cullen clearly placed little faith in those 
mediation efforts. As the Tautoro party would not be carrying arms to the Kaikohe hui, 
it provided the ideal opportunity, he decided, to arrest them. With military precision he 
laid out a plan for nine constables from around Northland to converge on Kaikohe, while 
he and a larger Auckland police contingent would travel there via chartered steamer to the 
Bay of Islands port of Opua.102 
This was to be a heavily armed raid by a force which had been officially unarmed since 
1896.103 Cullen himself, although trained in the use of arms in Ireland and accustomed to 
the use of force in his work, would later tell the 1909 Royal Commission on the police that 
he preferred to use his fists rather than a baton.104 When still greater persuasion was called 
for, he and other senior police officers regularly ‘borrowed’ Defence Force soldiers to serve 
as auxiliary police, and they did so on this occasion.105 The Küao operation was expanded 
to include 40 artillerymen sent from Auckland to Russell by chartered steamer, there to 
await further orders. Cullen himself travelled from Auckland with a sergeant and ten 
police armed with rifles and revolvers. Well aware of the potential risks of the expedition, 
he went to great lengths to keep it secret, less to maintain an element of surprise then to 
reduce the possibility of subsequent political damage. “I succeeded in getting the men 
away from Auckland without the press knowing anything of our movements,’ he told 
his Commissioner. “We were thus spared the inconvenience of having reporters at our 
heels, and sending sensational statements all over the colony.”106 After preparing arrest 
102  Insp. Cullen to Comm. Dinnie, 5/9/1903, ibid.
103  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 27.
104  Evidence of Insp. Cullen, AJHR 1909, H-16B, p. 360, line 233
105  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 27
106  Insp. Cullen to Comm. Dinnie, 28/9/03, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
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warrants, Cullen, Blomfield and the mounted men rode the seven miles into Kaikohe 
on an early morning in September. The town was quiet, with no sign of Küao or rifle-
waving warriors. Cullen’s informants told him that Küao and his leading supporters were 
expecting to meet the Rarawas at Matakohekohe, a small settlement about a mile short of 
Tautoro and Blomfield persuaded the Rarawa party to go out there and engage the chief 
in discussion.
A plan of arrest was hastily improvised. The waiting foot police were contacted by 
telephone and joined the main party 45 minutes later. The mounted men were sent 
out to Matakohekohe by a back route to block any attempt at escape. They locked the 
gates across the road and kept watch on the meeting from cover as Cullen and his men 
approached in wagons. The police were thus able to surround the gathering unnoticed 
and took Küao and his men completely by surprise. As predicted, the Tautoro party was 
unarmed and offered no resistance. Twenty ringleaders, including the chief, were taken 
back to the Kaikohe courthouse and charged with threatening to shoot Mr Blomfield and 
the members of the block committee. In his capacity as magistrate, Blomfield remanded 
the men without bail to allow the police to seize their weapons. This raised the problem 
of where the prisoners could be held, since the town’s lockup was a single small cell. With 
characteristic decisiveness, Cullen hired the solid brick billiard hall which still stands in 
the main street opposite the Kaikohe Hotel.107 The arrested men were taken there and 
kept under guard while Cullen and his mounted police rode out to Küao’s settlement 
where they found 33 shotguns, mostly old and ineffective. Certain that these were not 
the best of the stockpiled weapons, the Inspector threatened to hold his prisoners until 
more arms were given up. Reluctantly and after much discussion, one of the chief’s senior 
supporters showed Cullen the missing weapons – five rifles, eight revolvers and several 
more shotguns loaded with home-made bullets – hardly the fearsome arsenal the police 
had been led to expect. The arrested men were finally released after spending several days 
in the billiard hall. Fines ranging from 25 to a hundred pounds were imposed on them, 
along with promises that the court could proceed with hearing claims over the Tautoro 
107		q.v.,	7/4/2002
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land. Chief Küao troubled the law no further before his death two years later, when his son 
Maea assumed both his mana and his policy of peaceful compliance. From the Inspector’s 
point of view it had been a model operation – pre-emptive, heavily armed, bloodless, 
discreet and entirely effective. He would later deploy the same tactics in dealing with a 
more complex and volatile instance of organised Mäori resistance. 
The Küao raid also appeared to give Cullen confidence that he understood and knew how 
to deal with the Mäori mind. Five years after the arrests Maea Küao asked for the return 
of the tribe’s confiscated weapons. Cullen agreed only to hand back the shotguns, not the 
rifles or revolvers, on the grounds that “firearms in the hands of excitable and passionate 
natives are a source of danger even to the natives themselves…. The Tautoro natives”, he 
advised his Commissioner, “belong to the Ngapuhi tribe which has always been rather 
inclined to ignore the law whenever it suited their purpose to do so and if they again 
found a stubborn agitator such as Kuao was, to rally round, they might cause considerable 
uneasiness among settlers.”108 No such stubborn agitator appeared in the ensuing years, 
even as Maea Küao watched his ancestral lands dwindle from 7,000 acres to two small 
wähitapu, or sacred sites, and fertile European-owned grazing land replaced the bush 
around Tauanui.
108  Insp. Cullen to Comm. Dinnie, 16/9/1908, P 1/273, 08/1981, Archives NZ
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Chapter four 
‘It was very laughable to see the strikers’ – subduing militant labour
Cullen’s abrasive manner led to growing enmity with his colleagues at all levels 
but did not prevent him attaining the rank of Police Commissioner. In that role 
his uncompromising strategy for breaking the Waihi strike, extending to illegal 
tactics later described as tantamount to ‘judicial murder’, made him admired 
in some circles but bitterly reviled in others. His opposition to organised labour 
extended to preventing efforts by his own men to unionise, further contributing 
to his unpopularity among working people. However during the nationwide 
1913 strike, Cullen’s tactics of encouraging violent confrontation to crush 
the strike proved less successful than at Waihi, and his reputation at senior 
government level was temporarily tarnished. 
‘The discipline here [in Auckland] under Inspector Cullen is strict… This 
satisfactory condition of things is in large measure due to the exertions 
of the present Inspector, as when he took charge police matters in the 
Auckland District were in a state of great disorganisation….’
(Report of 1905 Police Commission, AJHR 1905, H-16B, p. v)
From Inspector to Commissioner
As in 1894 when he assumed command of Wanganui’s police, Cullen took over the 
Auckland, Northland and Waikato Inspectorate at a low point in the public reputation of 
its officers, and with a stern determination to effect improvements. He discovered to his 
distaste that “for a long time you could not go upstairs [in the barracks] without tripping 
over empty beer-bottles in the passages” and his measures to eliminate drinking on the 
premises extended to having his men searched for liquor each morning.109 Rigorously 
109  Evidence of Insp. Cullen, AJHR, 1909 H-16B, p. 358, line 158
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disciplined in his own personal behaviour, Cullen demanded the highest standards of 
conduct in those who worked for him and he acquired a reputation throughout the force 
for RIC-style austerity, extending to banning his junior constables from displaying pictures 
on the walls of their rooms in the purpose-built Auckland police barracks.110
A more popular innovation was the gymnasium, the first of its kind in the country when 
it opened in 1906. This facility arose from Cullen’s lifelong emphasis on physical fitness 
and also from his close relationship with a strapping and moustachioed constable in his 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tauranga station, Arthur Skinner. An outstanding athlete who held two world records, 
Skinner was regarded by Cullen as ‘the best man south of the line’ (ie the equator) at 
physical training for police work.111 He later transferred to Auckland’s wharf police and 
was relied upon so heavily by Cullen that he became regarded as his right-hand man.112 
110  NZ Truth, 19/4/1913, p. 5
111  Evidence of Insp. Cullen, AJHR 1909, H-16b, p. 360, line 222
112  Rorke, J, ‘Skinner, Arthur’, DNZB vol. 3, Auckland University Press 1996, p. 477-478
Portrait of Insp. Cullen, cover of NZ Graphic 1907
46
Czar Cullen • Chapter 4
In general, however, Cullen’s style of leadership was most popular only with those who 
did not have to experience it directly, while many of his colleagues feared and even actively 
disliked him for his sharp tongue and short temper. His insistence on military-style 
discipline was described as “ludicrous and cruelly unnecessary in many of its aspects”, 
and often ran counter to efforts to modernise policing practice.113 He opposed growing 
specialisation in the force, for example towards acquiring the expertise at fingerprinting 
which was championed by his modernising Commissioner Walter Dinnie, and instead 
required his men to be rotated in and out of central office work to retain RIC-type values 
of physical toughness.114 “A man in my position must have a certain number of enemies”, 
he believed, and he exercised his talent for enmity not just on those far beneath him in 
rank but also on an ever-growing list of senior colleagues, including his Auckland Sub-
Inspectors Black and Mitchell, his Police Surgeon and Auckland’s Chief Magistrate.115 
By 1909 John Cullen was eleven years into his post as Inspector of the Auckland district, 
and the most senior Inspector in the country. In that year he was given the opportunity to 
defend his administration before yet another Royal Commission into the state of the police 
force, and rose avidly to the occasion. This, the second such Commission during Dinnie’s 
term as Commissioner, was appointed to inquire into falling recruitment numbers and 
complaints of unsuitable recruits and poor behaviour among serving policemen. Cullen 
did not mince his words and gave evidence amounting to an unofficial interview for 
Dinnie’s position. The Inspector excoriated the current administrative systems, described 
many of the recent recruits as “as bad as they could be”, and proposed a redesigned 
uniform and equipment. “I am naturally a strict man”, he declared, implying that Dinnie 
was deficient in that respect.116 The unfortunate Dinnie could not let such a performance 
go unchallenged and told the Commission that much of Cullen’s evidence was untrue 
and activated by malice. Cullen, he said, was vindictive, and “he does bear malice very 
113	 	quoted	in	Hill,	R	,	Iron Hand… p. 277
114  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 231
115  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 209, p. 229, p. 232 
116  Evidence of Insp. Cullen, AJHR 1909 H16B, p. 358, line 162
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often”. 
While acknowledging Cullen as “a most strict and capable officer,” Dinnie maintained 
that, “If he once takes a dislike to anyone, he carries the feeling to a degree.” He even 
implied collusion between Cullen and a member of the Commission.117 The Commission, 
however, favoured Cullen’s account over that of his superior, and following the release of 
a report highly critical of the Commissioner, the Prime Minister asked Dinnie to resign. If 
Cullen’s attacks on his Commissioner were at least in part designed to remove a superior 
officer whom he clearly despised, then they succeeded, and Dinnie was forced to step down 
in late 1909.118 Thus was Cullen given very valuable political support for his ambition to 
attain his profession’s highest office. 
Following a two-year interregnum in which the force was headed by the under-secretary 
of Justice, John Cullen finally gained the pre-eminent position he had sought since at least 
1903.119 Controversy continued to dog his appointment. Perhaps because of Cullen’s highly 
confrontational personal manner, the government at first favoured a Protestant magistrate 
for the Commissioner’s post. The country’s Catholic bishops chose to regard this as anti-
Catholic prejudice and threatened electoral retribution unless Cullen, a longtime pillar of 
their faith, was given the job.120 Their campaign was successful, and 36 years after his arrival 
in Wellington as a rural Connaught constable, Cullen became the first Commissioner to 
have risen through every rank of New Zealand’s national police force.  
On taking office in 1912 Commissioner Cullen took a house in Wellington’s Mt Victoria 
with a prime view of the waterfront, the site, a year later, for the most demanding challenges 
of his short but very fraught administration. In the years since the pacification of Chief Küao, 
Mäori unrest had almost ceased to trouble the state but in its place an increasingly militant 
117 Evidence of W. Dinnie, ibid, p. 499, line 1,7, 8; Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 253
118 Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 237-9, 256
119 Ibid, p. 275
120 Sweetman, A, Bishop in the Dock, Auckland University Press, 1997, p. 141. Allegations of prejudice 
both for and against Catholics were a perennial feature of the NZ Police. See eg. Hill, Iron Hand…. 
p. 147-8
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organised working class had arisen as the greatest threat to civil order. Intense surveillance 
of working class organizations had been an important pre-emptive function of the police 
ever since the 1880s, but since about 1905 a new spirit of assertion and dissent had grown 
up within sections of the labour movement. 121 Some years earlier Cullen had predicted that 
capital and labour would eventually face a climactic showdown requiring all the energies of 
the country’s police force, and in his own term as Commissioner he would be proved correct 
by a series of dramatic, often extremely violent and ultimately tragic civil conflicts.122 
Fatal impact at Waihi
Just days after taking over the Commissioner’s desk, Cullen received word of a strike in 
the gold-mining town of Waihi. For three months from March 1912, the usual police 
presence in Waihi, six constables under Sgt Wohlmann, appeared adequate to contain the 
situation. In May Cullen’s district Inspector Wright, based in Thames, assured him that:
“not one act of lawlessness of any kind has been committed…. The strike 
Executive has assisted the Police in warning the men to conduct themselves 
properly … as long as the Mine owners do not attempt to open the mines 
with new hands I see no more reason to expect violence now than during 
the last eleven weeks.’123
Two months later the stakes in the dispute were unexpectedly raised, not on the goldfields 
but in Parliament. When the ruling Liberal Party fell on a confidence motion it was 
replaced by the more conservative Reform Party, firmly opposed to the militant unionism 
now to the fore in Waihi. Its leader, Ulster-born William Massey, was a man much more to 
Cullen’s political tastes than his predecessor and would prove to be an inflexible Minister 
of Labour.124 His Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Alexander Herdman, was an 
even closer ally of the Police Commissioner. Described as “encrusted with conservative 
121  Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 341-2
122  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 276
123  Insp. Wright to Comm. Cullen, 15/5/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
124		Gustafson	B,	‘William	Ferguson	Massey’,	DNZB vol. 3, Auckland Uni. Press, 1996, p. 316-319
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prejudices … and ready to employ force ruthlessly for the purpose of upholding law and 
order”, Herdman became known to the labour movement as ‘the Iceberg Minister’.125 
Acting closely in concert, these three men would spend much of the next two years locked 
in no-quarter combat with the country’s industrial unionism movement. For his own part, 
Cullen did not hesitate to employ tactics which were apparently illegal or at least highly 
questionable. Dinnie’s reservations about Cullen’s high-handed and vindictive nature were 
fully endorsed by the means to which he descended in order to crush the militant unions. 
Just two weeks after winning office, Prime Minister Massey sent a commission to report on 
the situation at Waihi. Their report described a town in which decent citizens were afraid to 
walk the streets, where strikers carried pistols, and where industrial sabotage and terrorism 
were advocated. These claims were denied by the strike leaders and Sergeant Wohlmann 
and his men found little evidence to support them. Undeterred, Massey released the 
report to the newspapers, creating a climate of anti-union hysteria and widespread calls 
for government intervention. On 30 July, even before this damning report was released, 
Cullen cabled Inspector Wright that, on the basis of reports from an informer within the 
Waihi strikers’ ranks, he had decided on sending in police reinforcements.126 I have been 
unable to discover whether Cullen’s decision to initiate large-scale police involvement 
in the strike was prompted by a directive from the government or made on his own 
initiative. Regardless, his subsequent actions and statements make it clear that he saw the 
police role in the strike not as neutral defenders of civil order but rather as active agents 
of an anti-strike administration.
From early September the mine-owners began to recruit strike-breakers, among 
them known criminals, to come to Waihi and reopen the mine alongside members of 
breakaway ‘arbitrationist’ unions. (For convenience, the term ‘strike-breakers’ will be used 
henceforward to refer to the combined groups opposed to the striking miners.) Although 
he had still received no reports of actual law-breaking, Cullen then began to send large 
125  Maoriland Worker 7/3/1913; Butterworth S, ‘Alexander Herdman’ DNZB, vol. 3 1996, p. 211-212
126		Comm.	Cullen	to	Insp.	Wright,	quoted	in	Campbell	R	‘The	Role	of	the	Police	in	the	Waihi	Strike:	
some new evidence’, Political Science vol. 26 no. 2 (1974) p. 35
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numbers of specially selected police to Waihi. Wright was instructed to send a sergeant 
and ten constables “who are strong and muscular and can be thoroughly relied upon”, and 
men from districts as distant as Invercargill were similarly called upon, Cullen stressing 
that they should arrive armed but in plain clothes and without alerting the press.127 As 
at Tautoro in 1903 and at other times in his career, close and skilful management of the 
media would mark Cullen’s campaign in Waihi.
In addition to flooding the formerly law-abiding Waihi with armed police, the newly 
appointed Police Commissioner abandoned his national responsibilities on several 
occasions to appear in person in the small and remote mining town.128 On a visit in 
early September he announced that strikers’ tactics such as ‘following up’ (closely 
shadowing strike-breakers or arbitrationists and jeering at them) were now deemed 
illegal, and summonses for such activities were issued the same night. “If we succeed in 
getting the leaders bound over,” he confided to Herdman, “we will have tied their hands 
completely.”129 More than 50 leaders of the striking union appeared in the local court in 
the following days, where they were either bound over to keep the peace or sentenced to 
a year in gaol. Most took the second option and were sent to Auckland’s Mt Eden prison. 
127  Comm. Cullen to Insp. Mitchell, 3/9/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ; Comm. Cullen to Insp. Kiely, 
4/9/1912, ibid.
128  In his absence he had an able deputy in the person of the similarly authoritarian Inspector Ellison, 
who was raised in 1913 to the newly-created rank of Superintendent. (Hill, Iron Hand…p. 281)
129  Comm. Cullen to A. Herdman, 8/9/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
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A handwritten account of the noisy gathering to farewell them from Waihi was given to 
the Police, unsigned except for the inscription ‘Wireless or Bush Telegraph message for 
the information of Waihi police’.130 The term ‘wireless’, later used by Inspector Wright 
in the same context, appears to have been police code for a confidential report by an 
informer. Infiltration of radical workers’ organizations by police informers was a practice 
extending back at least to the 1890 maritime strike, and such secret intelligence was relied 
upon heavily by Cullen, although at times it proved highly inaccurate and self-serving.131 
By late September more than 70 extra police were occupying the town’s hotels. Their presence 
served to harden the views of unionists, who saw them as partisan and not committed to 
maintaining order between the parties. Labour historian H. Roth agrees that Waihi marked 
the first example of “open State intervention in labour disputes on the employer’s side”.132 
Encouraged by this heavy police presence and the large body of strike-breakers they had 
recruited, the mine-owners decided to reopen the Waihi mine in early October. Cullen 
returned to oversee the police role in this operation and nearly 80 ‘magnificent specimens 
of physical fitness’, many on horseback, were on Waihi’s main street as around 1500 strikers 
confronted an equal number of scabs.133 The latter were transported to the mine in open 
horse-drawn carriages known as brakes, with a police driver at the reins. 
A month later Cullen received a further report of a strike meeting infiltrated by the 
informant ‘Wireless’, to the effect that the strikers remained set on victory “if they have 
to wait 12 months for it”.134 The Commissioner returned yet again to Waihi, apparently 
determined to remain there until the strike was crushed. The day after his arrival he 
arranged that the strike-breakers would no longer travel between the mine and their 
homes in brakes but would instead march down the main street in a body, directly 
confronting the massed strikers.  On a busy Saturday night, 5 November, a crowd of 
130  ‘Wireless’, handwritten note, 10/9/1912, ibid.
131  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 72
132  Roth H, Trade Unions in New Zealand, AH and AW Reed, 1973, p. 35
133  cited in Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 286
134  Insp. Wright to Comm. Cullen, 2/11/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
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strikers and supporters were cleared by a charge of mounted police led by Cullen’s 
offsider Arthur Skinner, a tactic some witnesses described as brutal.135 Among the fleeing 
strike supporters was labour leader and future Prime Minister Bob Semple who “had to 
jump a fence to get away quick enough”.136
 
Cullen’s frequent and remarkably frank telegraphic communications with Herdman 
during this period are the main source of information on his methods and goals, both 
open and covert. The cables confirm that he had a deliberate strategy to, “keep police in 
the background as much as possible so as to get workers to have confidence in themselves 
to go about without police protection.” 137 Pitting one large group of men, including some 
violent criminals, against another with utterly opposed attitudes predictably resulted in 
vicious street fighting. An Opposition MP later told the House that such tactics:
“…are purely provocative. If you march large bodies of men along footpaths 
four abreast in an ordinary town, where they must come into conflict with 
people, and if feeling is running high, you are adopting tactics calculated to 
provoke disorder.”138 
On Monday 11 November, Cullen described “two or three dozen fights ending up in the 
strikers being routed and chased off ... followed by the workers who dealt out many cut 
faces, bleeding noses and black eyes. It was very laughable to see the strikers running at 
the end in all directions”.139 Press reporters found the scene less laughable, the Auckland 
Star claiming that the police took at least 20 minutes to control “a living mass of enraged 
humanity, a perfect debacle…”140  Cullen’s propensity for vindictiveness and inciting public 
135 Hill, Iron Hand… p. 286
136 Insp. Wright to Comm. Cullen, 5/11/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ. (Some historians of the NZ 
labour movement have pointed out that violence by police against mass demonstrations and strikers 
at Waihi led to the formation of the NZ Labour Party, as a political vehicle to close the gap between 
government and unrepresented sections of the public.)
137 Comm. Cullen to Herdman, 10/11/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
138 J. Robertson MP, NZPD v. 162 p. 161
139 Comm. Cullen to Herdman 11/11/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
140 Auckland Star 11/11/1912, p. 7
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disorder for political ends reached its apotheosis when he himself engaged in a fistfight 
with one striker. Federation of Labour witnesses insisted that “Cullen himself acted like a 
mad bully; that he split the mouth of a hunted and brutally illtreated man so that it had to 
be stitched up by a doctor… the Police urged the scabs to assault isolated strikers and in 
many cases acted like lunatics let loose from Bedlam.”141 Cullen denied the more egregious 
allegations but admitted to Herdman that the battered striker, “got a hiding which… he 
richly deserved”.142
That afternoon Cullen persuaded the strike leaders based in their Miner’s Hall in Waihi’s 
main street to withdraw most of their pickets in the interests of lessening disorder (although 
he made no such approach to the increasingly aggressive strikebreakers). Overnight, 
although a nearby miner’s hall was attacked, just a token force of pickets remained in the 
Waihi hall, evidence of the strikers’ continued faith in Cullen’s undertaking to protect them. 
The following morning, 12 November, saw the fatal culmination of the Commissioner’s 
strategy of deliberate physical confrontation. Although the events of that day have entered 
labour mythology, they have never been fully clarified and conflicting accounts are now 
impossible to reconcile, but what seems unarguable is that the strikebreakers’ actions were 
planned in advance. The Otago Daily Times reported that the strikebreakers had permission 
from the mining company to suspend work for the day, and there are further suggestions 
that the police had prior knowledge of the events of the morning of 12 November.143 
As the marching body of strikebreakers approached the Miners Hall, they rushed its closed 
doors. Shots rang out, from which direction it was impossible to tell, and a strikebreaker 
was hit in the leg. Strikebreakers and police, including Cullen himself, then burst into the 
hall whose occupants fled through a rear door. One of them, Fred Evans, was batoned 
by his pursuer, Constable Wade, who received a bullet in the abdomen. Cullen claimed 
141  Maoriland Worker 22/11/1912
142  Comm. Cullen to Hon. A. Herdman, 30/1/1913, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
143  “The night before… the police warned a businessman with premises across the road from the 
[miners’] hall to make sure that he did not let his children onto the streets in the morning.” Hill, Iron 
Hand…, p. 288 
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Evans fired the shot, but other witnesses insisted it came from the mass of strike-breakers, 
and only after Wade had batoned Evans to the ground. None disagree that Evans was then 
viciously beaten. Wade was taken to hospital and the badly injured Evans to jail. In his daily 
dispatch to Herdman, Cullen was jubilant. “This morning’s occurrence undoubtedly kills 
the strike here and if Wade’s injuries are as light as the doctors say they are the victory will 
be cheap.”144 The constable’s injuries did indeed prove minor, but the barely conscious 
Evans was denied medical treatment for some hours and died the following day.
Upon taking over the Miner’s Hall the strikebreakers openly wreaked vengeance on 
the strikers, with police either standing by or actively colluding. Leading unionists 
were given 48 hours to leave Waihi and their president, a former policeman, was 
severely beaten and thrown aboard a departing train. In the following days about 
300 more residents, mostly women and children, were driven out of town, the 
police supervising as they boarded trains to Auckland. No arrests were made during 
this period, although dozens of strikers were already in jail for trifling offences.145 
 
The nine-month strike was ended, but at terrible and irremediable cost. Through 
subsequent legal proceedings the union movement attempted to establish that the police 
144  Comm. Cullen to Herdman, 12/11/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
145  Hill, Iron Hand, p. 290
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were criminally responsible for Evans’ death, but an evidently partisan coroner and jury 
absolved them. However, in a later private communication which it is reasonable to 
assume he never expected would be made public, Cullen told Herdman that Evans had 
died from the “rough handling given him by the mob”.146 The forced entry of the Miners 
Hall and the opening of its safe were found to be illegal, but the government declined to 
inquire into wider allegations that the entire police operation at Waihi was a well-planned 
conspiracy of major proportions. Cullen’s front-row role in the events of November 1912 
marked him permanently as a bitter enemy of the labour movement, which issued many 
calls for his dismissal. One branch of the Socialist Party deplored the “unmanly conduct 
and principle exhibited by the Commissioner” and said he was “unworthy to hold the 
responsible position as a keeper of the peace”.147 Herdman was prompted to demand 
explanations from his Police Commissioner for his more extreme actions but appeared 
satisfied with his responses, and Prime Minister Massey expressed full confidence in the 
actions of his Police Commissioner.148 By inciting (ultimately fatal) disorder in order 
to uphold the employers’ position, Cullen had evidently acted in the interests of the 
government while clearly breaching the ostensibly neutral role of the police force.
The police form their own union 
Seemingly undeterred by the abhorrence in which he was now held by a large section of the 
population, the Commissioner began the new year by implementing many of the reforms 
he had advocated to the 1909 Police Commission. The Police Regulations of March 1913 
required policemen to pass qualifying exams for promotion, imposed new disciplinary 
rules and gave all staff an extra shilling a day. Awkward shako headgear was replaced 
by the familiar domed helmet, bearing a new badge designed by Cullen himself which 
remains in use to this day. One significant provision which remained unchanged was 
the prohibition on forming ‘combinations’, or unions, which would enable policemen 
146  Comm. Cullen to Herdman, 30/01/1913, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
147  Socialist Party, Nightcaps, to Herdman letter rec. 10/12/1912, P1 1912/861, Archives NZ
148  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 293
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to negotiate directly over their working conditions and voice grievances without risk 
of retribution. By 1913 serving members of the force had accumulated a host of such 
grievances. Those on the beat objected to having to drill on their days off for no extra 
pay. Cullen preferred ex-RIC men as new recruits, advertising for them in his homeland, 
and was also felt to favour ex-RIC veterans for the most desirable posts.149 Many police 
felt uneasy about the tactics they saw used at Waihi, which saw criminals escape justice 
while unionists were imprisoned for trivial offences. “If there had been no Waihi”, wrote 
“A Plainclothes Man” in the Maoriland Worker, “there might not have been any organised 
movement amongst us by police malcontents.”150
That organised movement emerged first in Auckland, where Cullen’s harsh 13-year 
Inspectorate had left a legacy of resentment. NZ Truth reported, “Auckland has been 
known amongst constables… as the worst station in the Dominion in which to work – 
particularly for single men.”151 In mid-April 1913 a group of up to 50 Auckland police 
met in defiance of their Regulations to form a Police Association “approximating that of 
a trade union”. With customary celerity, Cullen immediately travelled to Auckland with 
his close confidant Alexander Herdman and paraded the full muster of 70 men. They 
related such grievances as having to consume their meals standing up while on duty and 
being forbidden to consume food between 7pm and noon next day, and asked for an 
extra shilling a day. The response was volcanic. A member of the newly formed Police 
Association recalled long afterwards that “the Commissioner said many hard things which 
had to be swallowed”.152 NZ Truth elaborated that “Cullen lost his temper and became a 
very angry party. He informed any man who did not like the job that his resignation would 
look well on the Commissioner’s table.”153 This was no idle threat. The following week, 
on Cullen’s instructions, the Association’s secretary, Constable Smyth, was transferred to 
149  Truth 19 April 1913, p. 5; Hill, Iron Hand… p. 297
150  Maoriland Worker, 16/5/1913
151  NZ Truth 19/4/1913, p. 5
152  Smith T, NZ Police Journal, 14/8/1940
153  NZ Truth, 3/5/1913, p. 5
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Greymouth, a traditional punishment post.154 A month later he was dismissed from the 
force for a minor infraction which he insisted was a mistake. With trademark alliterative 
verve, Truth referred to the Commissioner thereafter as ‘Caesar’ (or sometimes ‘Tsar’) 
Cullen, declaring that his “mailed fist had descended on Constable Smyth, who struck out 
for his pals and received the glassy stare and the outraged authority glance”.155 Another 
liberal paper opined that:
“The attitude adopted by Commissioner Cullen towards the police constables 
of Auckland, after they had been induced to give frank expression of their 
grievances, is fairly characteristic of the existing squatter government to all 
classes of labour.”156 
However the condemnation of the pro-labour press mattered far less than the unswerving 
support of Herdman who insisted in Parliament that, “there is a danger to the whole 
community if an association is permitted to exist in the ranks of the Police Force.”157 The 
nascent Police Association was forced to disband and was not revived until the election of 
a Labour government 23 years later.
War on the wharves
The long-anticipated nationwide trial of strength between militant unions and major 
employers erupted in Wellington in late October 1913, when the city’s 1500 watersiders 
were locked out following a brief but technically illegal stopwork meeting. Cullen lost 
no time calling for reinforcements to the Wellington police. Men from surrounding 
rural districts were ordered to Wellington, and patriotic citizens were asked to lend 
horses to them. “Our experience at Waihi…” Cullen told the press, “showed that at such 
154  ‘…Greymouth, that station which so often in the history of New Zealand policing was the 
destination of those who were being punished.’ Hill, The Colonial Frontier Tamed, p. 322
155  NZ Truth, 10/5/1913, p. 5
156  NZ Times, 6/5/1913
157  Herdman A, NZPD vol. 166, p. 121
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times as these one mounted constable is worth 20 on foot”.158. However before these 
reinforcements could arrive, the militant and aggrieved Wellington wharfies rushed the 
wharf gates and took control of the waterfront area. Soon afterwards they held a huge 
and excited public meeting at the Basin Reserve at which several speakers, including 
labour leaders Harry Holland and Peter Fraser, made inflammatory statements, duly 
recorded by the police present. 
This was to be a far greater conflict than at Waihi, and its speed and scale meant that 
the police, even when augmented by out-of-town men, were compelled to stand by and 
watch the first act of a revolution unfolding in the capital. Within days of the Wellington 
stoppage, watersiders in most other port cities also ceased work and other unions struck 
in support. In Wellington 6000 were soon on strike and the city assumed a siege mentality. 
“There is no doubt,” Prime Minister Massey later thundered in Parliament, “that there 
was an idea in the minds of some of these people that they would be able to seize the 
government of this country.”159 Cullen, despite his vaunted network of informants, had 
either failed to fully foresee the extent of this industrial conflagration or was covertly 
inciting it in order to deliver a coup de grace to militant unionism nationally. 
There is a good deal of circumstantial evidence that the government was not caught quite 
so off guard by the strike as it appeared. This sudden and total disruption to the country’s 
busiest waterfront erupted at a time more favourable to employer interests than to the 
union movement, and may have been provoked by an employer and farmer sector well 
aware that the government would back them in a further industrial stand-off along Waihi 
lines. Senior government officials, in collusion with large employers such as ship-owners, 
may therefore have had a covert agenda to annihilate the industrial union movement 
nationally, and as at Waihi, “An escalation in short-term disorder was deemed necessary 
in the interests of medium- and long-term order.”160 The best evidence for this hidden 
158  Evening Post, 22/10/1913
159  Massey, PM, NZPD vol. 167 (1913) p. 1193
160  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 307
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agenda is provided by a senior figure not privy to it, Chief of General Staff Col. EH Heard, 
who speculated that Cullen’s strategy of encouraging open confrontations with strikers 
may have been part of a wider anti-union policy.161 As noted in my introduction, Miles 
Fairburn has disputed that Cullen colluded with senior figures in the Massey government 
to destroy militant unionism through the strategies employed during the 1913 strike. 
My own conclusion concurs with that of Richard Hill who, in the only detailed analysis 
of this question, found that “the Crown wanted a crackdown on militant labour, and 
were prepared to use whatever means were necessary.”162 As a recently proven enemy of 
organised labour whether within his own force, at Waihi, or elsewhere, it frequently fell to 
Cullen to determine what those means would be.
The scale of the dispute called for members of the public to be recruited, not just as 
strikebreakers as at Waihi, but also as auxiliary and entirely untrained police. A week after 
the strike began the first small parties of special constables from the Manawatu, Wairarapa 
and Taranaki districts began to arrive in Wellington on horseback. Heard urged Cullen to 
congregate them on the outskirts of the city until their numbers were sufficient to defend 
themselves against the massed strikers, but Cullen billeted the first parties in a depot 
near the wharves which was promptly raided by the strikers and destroyed. A further 
riot occurred in Lambton Quay after specials strolled through the streets ostentatiously 
twirling their batons. Thereafter, despite Heard’s deep reluctance to involve his forces, 
the specials were housed in the cluster of military buildings at Mt Cook, near the site of 
Cullen’s original Armed Constabulary barracks and the present-day Massey University 
campus.163 The smell of horse dung soon hung heavy over the compound. 
161	Heard,	Col.	EH,	undated	confidential	report,	‘Waterside-Workers	strike	–	October,	November,	
December 1913’ AD 11, 2/1 Archives NZ
162 Hill, ‘The police the state and “lawless law”’ in Nolan (Ed.) Revolution, p. 88
163	Heard,	Col.	EH,	undated	confidential	report,	‘Waterside-Workers	strike	–	October,	November,	
December 1913’ AD 11, 2/1 Archives NZ
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The appearance on Wellington’s streets of these large bodies of men, armed officially with 
batons and unofficially with revolvers and their own horse-whips, provoked violence on a 
large scale. A gathering on 30 October of 2000 men in Post Office Square, opposite the main 
wharf gates, became a riot upon the arrival of 50 mounted regular police and specials. Heard 
believed that, by leading the specials through the massed strikers, the police had caused the 
riot.164 The Army barracks at Buckle St, temporary home to hundreds of specials, was the 
scene of further disorder on 3 November, when a crowd of strikers, supporters and passers-
by assembled outside it to jeer the men within. Two days earlier, in a striking demonstration 
of the regard in which the Police Commissioner was now held by the labour movement, 
Federation of Labour leader Bob Semple had announced, “Cullen is sheltering in an office, 
and will not be seen leading the men. I hope that there is no shooting, but if any is done, and 
Cullen will come out, I undertake to shoot him first.”165 This may have struck home with the 
Commissioner, who arrived at the barracks in the evening and ordered his regular mounted 
police to disperse the crowd, with the instruction (long afterwards associated with his name), 
“If they won’t go, ride over the top of them.”166 Unsurprisingly, this tactic failed to reduce 
164	Heard,	Col.	EH,	undated	confidential	report,	‘Waterside-Workers	strike	–	October,	November,	
December 1913’ AD 11, 2/1 Archives NZ
165 Dominion, 2/11/1913, p. 8
166	quoted	in	Dreaver,	A,	An Eye for Country: the life and work of Leslie Adkin, Victoria University 
Press with Te Papa, 1997, p. 107 
Specials watering horses in Oriental Bay. Alexander Turnbull Library
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the tension, missiles began to fly and a major riot was soon in progress. Cullen then ordered 
mounted specials to charge the crowd. It seems evident that both sides exchanged small-
arms fire, with one bullet narrowly missing Cullen himself, although the striker allegedly 
responsible was acquitted of attempting to murder the Commissioner. Pat Lawlor, a young 
reporter on the Wellington Dominion, later recalled that as, “the main body of the Specials 
charged down Taranaki St, shots were fired. … I saw flashes from the guns in the centre of 
the road.” He returned to his office and wrote an eyewitness account but later that night 
the ubiquitous Cullen appeared in the newspaper office and closely questioned Lawlor as to 
whether the specials, as well as the strikers, had used firearms. “I stuck to my guns about the 
guns” says Lawlor, but the story in next day’s paper “was all in favour of the specials”.167  
Far more than the regular police, the specials were widely resented and the target of much 
verbal and physical abuse. Cullen, Herdman and Massey nevertheless persisted in sending 
inexperienced and often volatile baton-wielding men into the fray, in part because they could 
not entirely rely on the regular force, lately infected with its own trade union virus, to carry 
out their ultimate objective of crushing the militant labour movement.168 Little real effort 
was made to end the strike on mutually agreed terms and once the specials outnumbered 
the strikers and began chafing under enforced lack of activity, they were deployed to re-open 
the wharves and to work them as scab labour, paid below union rates. On 5 November a 
long column of specials rode three abreast from Buckle Street down to the railway wharf, 
pausing periodically to pursue and baton stone-throwing crowds. The entire waterfront was 
reoccupied, ensuring that strikebreakers and Harbour Board staff could begin to clear the 
backlogged cargo. This moment marked the inevitable defeat of the strike, with the strikers 
thereafter on the defensive, but Cullen ensured that Waihi-style pressure was kept up. A 
Taranaki special constable recalled that, on returning to the Buckle Street barracks that 
afternoon, “the Commissioner of Police came along and gave us some good advice… to the 
effect that we were too gentle…. As soon as anyone started abusing us we were to arrest him, 
167		Lawlor,	P,	quoted	in	End of an Era, 1979, p. 33-34
168  In secret communications with the Auckland Harbour Board, PM Massey said ‘Any settlement 
arrived at should be such as will prevent a recurrence of these troubles for some time to come…’ (PM 
9/13)
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and if he resisted we were to use our waddies [batons].”169 Similar advice was given to the 
regular police, Cullen telling one Inspector, “If an attack is made upon either uniform men 
or specials let all hands wade in with batons and use them with energy.”170 
The country’s other ports could now be successively secured in a similar fashion. In 
Auckland the conservative Farmers Union had responded enthusiastically to the call 
to suppress the strike, telling its members “the sooner a good fight comes, the sooner 
peace will reign”.171 However the senior Auckland police officer, Superintendent Mitchell, 
proved too conciliatory for Cullen’s taste, refusing to swear in special constables and 
tolerating union pickets as long as they maintained order. Mitchell was removed to the 
South Island and soon dismissed altogether. By early November more than 1000 specials 
were encamped in Army tents in the Domain.172 Again a massed column of mounted 
men took the wharves with little opposition and began loading piled-up produce. “You 
would imagine that Auckland was in a state of civil war,” said one resident. “Warship guns 
pointed at the town, armed men everywhere.” 173 
Cullen turned his attention to the port of Lyttelton, where the mayor had only reluctantly 
agreed to recruit specials after strikers tipped loaded railway wagons into the sea. The 
commander of the Christchurch specials wished to arm his men with rifles but Cullen, 
in a rare display of restraint, would agree only that “The mounted specials should carry a 
fully loaded service revolver” which might “only be used in life threatening situations.”174 
No such situations presented themselves. In a manoeuvre now well practised elsewhere, a 
party of specials and strikebreakers came over the Port Hills at 3am and Lyttelton awoke to 
the clatter of hooves and the sight of armed men guarding each intersection. A succession 
169  Burton mss- 2520, p. 93, ATL
170		Comm.	Cullen	to	Insp.	McKinnon,	24/11/1913,	P	1913/1968/6	special	constables	file	Archives	NZ
171  Farmers Union Advocate 25/10/1913, p. 6
172		Hughes,	V.	‘Massey’s	Cossacks	–	the	farmers	and	the	1913	strike’,	thesis,	p.	22	fn.	56
173		quoted	in	Olssen	E	The Red Feds, p. 193
174		Comm.	Cullen	to	Col.	Chaffey,	24/11/1913,	P	1913/1968/6	1913	special	constables	file,	Archives	NZ
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of warships reinforced the impression of overwhelming might, and the strikers obeyed 
scrupulously their leaders’ instructions to “Turn your face to the wall and fold your arms 
if the Specials march by”.175 The country’s smaller ports proved even less of a problem 
to subdue. Dunedin’s Superintendent Dwyer was ordered by Cullen to recruit mounted 
specials but chose to reopen the port using only his handful of regular police, with no 
disorder at all resulting. In a final death-blow to the strikers’ hopes, six of their leaders, 
including future Prime Ministers Fraser and Savage, were arrested for inflammatory 
speeches they had given some weeks earlier. Before the end of the year nearly all unions 
had returned to work and most ports were working normally, although in some small 
West Coast townships miners remained defiant until early 1914. 
The immediate aftermath of the strike further illustrates that the government, through its 
loyal servant the Police Commissioner, viewed the dispute as a definitive political trial of 
strength. Herdman instructed Cullen that the “criminals who belong to the old waterside 
workers union and who are now out of work should be told by the Police that they had 
better leave New Zealand”.176 However the enormous fiscal and social costs of bringing 
down the militant unions were more than even Cullen’s adroit political skills and fearsome 
reputation could entirely evade, and he was held at fault to varying degrees both by 
public opinion and the government. Thereafter Herdman assumed greater authority over 
policing matters, and two years later was being spoken of in the press as ‘the real [Police] 
Commissioner’.177 By that time, however, the advent of world war had almost overtaken 
the tumult of 1913 in the public mind, and the exigencies of wartime had generated a 
tolerance for the kind of coercive policing which the aging but untiring Cullen remained 
fully determined to implement.
175  Industrial Unionist, 13/11/1913, Christchurch Press, 27/11/1913, p. 8
176  A. Herdman to Comm. Cullen, cited in Hill, ‘The police, the state and “lawless law”’, p. 90
177  NZ Truth, 29/5/1915
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Chapter five
‘Everyone sailed for anyone he could get’ – suppressing wartime dissent
Policing during World War One brought out the best and worst of Cullen’s 
properties of determination, authoritarianism and high-handedness. In a 
brittle and intolerant society, his personality and policing style led to a level of 
confrontation with disempowered groups which was unnecessarily retributive 
and divisive. The most extreme and tragic instance, the 1916 raid on Rua 
Kenana’s community, is described in detail for its revelation of Cullen’s role as 
an instigator and planner of the raid, and the person principally responsible 
for its disastrous outcome. 
New Zealand at war
The outbreak of World War One midway through Cullen’s term as Police Commissioner 
simultaneously exacerbated the pressures already facing the force and reinforced his 
vigorously reactionary approach to dealing with them. 
An already depleted body of police lost a further 100 men who signed up before the 
government could move to prevent their colleagues from doing likewise. Policing was then 
declared a reserved occupation on the grounds that wartime required additional duties such 
as guarding sensitive installations subject to possible sabotage, and intelligence gathering. An 
example of the latter was given by Labour MP Paddy Webb who referred in Parliament to a 
confidential memo from Cullen asking his superintendents to make confidential inquiries:
“as to the probability of any labour troubles arising... It is known that 
Semple and other Federation agitators have been reorganising the labor 
malcontents for some time past and it is believed that he and others 
associated with him are watching and waiting for an opportunity to cause 
further trouble.”178
178  Comm. Cullen, cited by P. Webb, MP, NZPD, vol. 174, p. 885
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The unthinking patriotism which engulfed the country within months of the defeat of the 
1913 strike proved advantageous to Cullen’s administration in several respects. Since well 
before the war, opposition to conscription had been a central plank of the radical labour 
platform and even after the crushing industrial defeats of 1912 and 1913 the surviving 
vestiges of labour radicalism remained capable of threatening the war effort through control 
of key protected industries such as coal-mining, shipping and railways. That possibility was 
largely eliminated through sweeping restrictions on freedom of expression and other civil 
liberties, recruitment and (from late 1916), conscription. Even before the introduction of 
compulsory conscription all draft-eligible men were required to register for military service 
and Cullen’s officers were kept busy pursuing defaulters hiding out on remote stations, 
bush camps and wilderness areas such as the Orongorongo Valley near Wellington. 
Under these extreme circumstances, hard-fought conditions of work for the New Zealand 
police hours were rolled back, and working hours increased while real income declined. 
In the words of the official police historian, “While discipline in the New Zealand Police 
Force was in general being relaxed in response to the trend towards the benign policing 
of a ‘settled society’, this long-term trend was halted or even (at times) reversed during 
Cullen’s Commissionership.”179 The new Commissioner was even less than usually 
inclined to show sympathy for his men while three of his sons were at the front, one 
dying on a Belgian battlefield in 1916 and another some years after the war from the 
effects of poison gas.180 However for those men required, often against their wishes, to 
police the home front, repressive legislation combined with an intolerant social climate 
tended to make their job easier. 
One persistent difficulty to which the war provided the solution was the ‘one-woman-
brothel pest’, an entirely unintended consequence of the 1908 Police Offences Act which 
defined a brothel as a place where two or more women worked for the purposes of 
prostitution. The fragile legal status of a single prostitute working from her own premises 
179  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 327
180		Cullen	family	tree,	supplied	to	author	courtesy	Ros	Foster,	5/3/2003
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was confirmed by a subsequent test case which determined that “A prostitute’s home, 
when no other women frequents the house for prostitution, is not in the legal sense of 
the word a ‘brothel’...”181  By mid-1914 the brothel business in the capital was booming 
as the streets teemed with eager young men in khaki. The inner-city brothels suddenly 
represented a danger not just to public morality but to the health of the nation’s fighting 
men and therefore to the security and future of the nation. Venereal disease began to appear 
among troops who had not yet left New Zealand’s shores, and Cullen was advised that the 
infected troops blamed their condition on brothels on the southern edge of the central 
city, especially the notorious Cambridge Terrace, known as ‘Gallipoli’ for the number of 
troops coming to grief there.182 The ever-rising battlefield casualty rate and growing public 
intolerance spelled doom for the legislative anomaly that enabled one-woman brothels to 
operate, and they were abolished by legal amendment in August 1916.
The Rua expedition
New Zealand society during World War One became not only intensely patriotic but also 
highly intolerant and internally vindictive, and those deemed unconventional but harmless 
before the war had, by 1916, become targets for extreme state coercion. The most drastic 
of all such state operations was directed at the Tuhoe prophetic leader Rua Kenana and his 
mysterious community at Maungapohatu, deep inside the roadless Urewera. Since 1906 
Rua and his several hundred followers had occupied their well-ordered settlement carved 
out of the nearly impenetrable Urewera bush. The rare Pakeha visitors reported that the 
men grew their hair long and that their leader had several wives, claimed supernatural 
powers and condemned the inequality of Maori under the law. In less anguished times 
these marks of nonconformity were tolerated, but as the casualty lists lengthened in each 
day’s papers, the Maungapohatu community came to assume a more sinister caste. Rua, 
it was widely claimed, welcomed a German victory in the distant conflict. He was said to 
181  Cassells v. Hutcheson and another, NZ Law Reports,	vol.	27	(1908)	pp763-8,	quoted	in	Dalley,	B.,	
‘Lolly shops ‘Of the red-light kind” and “soldiers of the King”’, NZ Journal of History, vol. 30, no. 1, 
(April 1996) p. 4
182  NZ Truth, 20/5/1916
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discourage his people from enlisting (although Maori were exempt from conscription) 
and to be building up a well armed force of his own. This disturbing picture would prove 
to be almost entirely inaccurate, but it provided grounds for one of the largest civil police 
operations ever seen in New Zealand. Cullen took up the task with a vehemence whose 
consequences resound to the present day. 
In February 1916, two local police officers confronted Rua with warrants for his arrest 
for selling liquor (since Maori could not then hold a liquor licence). The alleged offences 
were not recent but had been held over from the previous year when Rua served three 
months in prison on a similar charge, which itself had been suspended from 1911. Not 
surprisingly, Rua found such legal leapfrog confusing and voiced his exasperation at 
his treatment by the government. His comments, at times intemperate and at others 
ambiguous, were carefully noted by the officers on Cullen’s instructions and they formed 
the basis for yet another charge against him, this time on the far more serious offence 
of sedition. Without waiting for the outcome of further meetings between Rua and 
government representatives, Cullen sought and received government approval for a full-
scale raid on the remote bush community.183 
From the outset it was to be a well-armed expedition. A group of Rua’s supporters wrote 
to the government stating that if the police came to arrest their leader, a gun would be 
fired in challenge.184 The prophet’s dangerous reputation had been further fostered by 
increasingly wild rumours in the press, claims that he “is pretty well supplied with rifles and 
ammunition obtained from Assyrian hawkers who … smuggled them into the Urewera 
Country under their fancy goods and cloths.”185  The Maungapohatu community, although 
known to be devout and entirely unfortified, was routinely referred to as a ‘stronghold’.186 
183		Statement	of	Issues,	Urewera	inquiry,	Waitangi	Tribunal,	Wai	894	#1.3.4,	no.	17.72
184  Baker, P, King and Country Call – New Zealanders, Conscription and the Great War, AUP 1988, 
p.	215.	The	harmless	firing	of	firearms	has	recently	been	established	as	a	traditional	symbolic	act	of	
defiance	amongst	Tuhoe.	
185  NZ Times, 1/4/1916
186  Binney, Mihaia, p. 83
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One highly coloured report described Rua as, ‘in ambush at Maungapohatu’ and said “his 
bodyguard is known to comprise several hundred Maoris and the local natives believe he 
will firmly resist arrest unless confronted by an overwhelming force….”.187 
Such unfounded rumours were used by Cullen to justify the scale of his raid in Rua’s 
community. “I was entitled to go armed to a man whom I knew to be a desperado” he 
said later, and in early March a large quantity of automatic pistols and ammunition was 
ordered from the Sydney police force, while carbines were borrowed from Defence stores 
and supplied to men with experience in using them.188 Such experience was most likely 
to be found among ex-RIC and military men, and these were given preference for places 
on the expedition. Cullen asked his Inspectors to nominate physically powerful officers, 
familiar with horses and firearms, to join the Rua expedition. He stressed that he wanted 
“strong, fit and athletic” men, terms practically identical to those used in 1912 when 
recruiting police for Waihi, and among the names put forward were several who had been 
prominent in that engagement, including the ever-faithful Arthur Skinner. A knowledge of 
Maori language and custom, or even prior experience of crowd control, was not required 
and John Neil, one of the young Wellington constables chosen, had only lived in New 
Zealand for six months. He was, however, an ex-RIC man, tough and athletic, and was to 
pay dearly for his Commissioner’s faith in those abilities. 
While most details of the planned operation were kept from the constables for as long 
as possible, there can be no doubt that those taking part were generally eager to do so. 
Denied the opportunity to go overseas to the war, working under additional restrictions 
at home, repeatedly enjoined to demonstrate their own patriotism and pursue those 
who did otherwise, they were a fiercely inspired body of men who yearned to prove 
themselves. This was not, in general, a body bent on peace-keeping, and Cullen was 
prepared to employ even more volatile manpower if necessary. A branch of the Legion 
of Frontiersmen, a volunteer patriotic force, offered the services and weapons of its 
187  NZ Times 1/4/1916
188  Auckland Star, 21/6/1916
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members to support the police expedition. A less suitable group of men to engage with 
a community such as Rua’s can hardly be imagined, but Cullen advised Herdman that 
at least 40 of the Frontiersmen, with “whatever firearms and ammunition they possess”, 
should be sworn in as special constables and dispatched to Maungapohatu if his own 
men proved unequal to the task before them.189  
The expedition was planned along stoutly military lines. An army surgeon was seconded 
to the party and Cullen exerted his high-level influence to secure equipment from Defence 
stores, inevitably placing pressure on wartime supplies. This major operation was not 
only minutely planned by Cullen, but personally led by him. Only physically fit and strong 
men, he insisted, those able to withstand harsh bush terrain, could take part yet he did 
not doubt that he himself, aged 65 and due to retire later that year, should be in the front 
rank.190 Cullen’s determination to lead the expedition in person suggests that, following 
his very mixed results during the 1913 waterfront strikes, he saw the raid on Rua as a heroic 
wartime battle in miniature, and a final opportunity to make his name for posterity. 
On the evening of 28 March 1916, therefore, New Zealand’s Police Commissioner 
arrived in Rotorua and met parties of police totalling 57 men from districts as far away 
as Invercargill, carrying their uniform in their packs. With the Auckland group were two 
important additional personnel, a senior reporter and press photographer. In a calculated 
breach of the secrecy surrounding the expedition, and a novel twist on Cullen’s inveterate 
desire to control press coverage of his actions, both men had been tipped off at short 
notice and invited to record the history-making events as they unfolded. John Birch, the 
NZ Herald’s mining and industrial reporter, had reported previously from Waihi where 
his coverage of the strike had appealed to Cullen, and the versions of the raid later recorded 
by both these ‘embedded journalists’ were uniformly partisan.
189 Cullen J to Herdman A, 6/3/1916, P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
190 This attitude is the more striking since, in the view of many long-serving NZ policemen, the rigours of a 
policing career suggested a pensionable retirement age of 60 rather than 65. (Hill, Iron Hand…p. 335)
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The men spent their first night at the road-head at Ruatahuna and next morning dressed 
in their dark-blue uniforms, Cullen remaining in his plainclothes outfit of tweed suit and 
porkpie hat. They were then issued with arms and ammunition, the 20 men with rifle 
experience receiving carbines and the remainder the new Australian service revolvers. 
In total, about 2000 rounds of ammunition were issued to the party, which then set out 
in two marching columns. After camping in the bush overnight the party continued up 
the mountain track to Maungapohatu just nine miles ahead, Cullen and several others 
on horseback while the rest toiled on foot. Reporter John Birch wrote that the men had 
their minds not only on their immediate objective but also on its possible outcome. 
“… what valuable land there is tied up, and in Maori hands, in this Urewera country… 
there are open spaces large enough to build towns upon.”191 These musings would prove 
sadly prophetic.
191  NZ Herald, 4/4/1916
Cullen heads the Rua expedition on the road to Ruatahuna. (From a  painting by Bob Kerr)
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The date was 2 April, the day a Sunday, as three armed columns converged on their goal. 
To forestall any attempt by Rua at escape, two smaller parties of local, mostly Maori-
speaking, police had also been sent into Maungapohatu from the opposite direction, and 
one of these arrived at Rua’s marae early that morning. They were greeted cordially by 
Rua, a powerful and authoritative figure aged 47. His followers, about a hundred men, 
women and children, even performed a dance of welcome for their visitors, in which, 
according to the guide Hauwaho, “the constables joined”, an indication, perhaps, of their 
familiarity with Mäori custom.192 No firearms were in evidence on the marae, and the 
police kept their revolvers concealed. Two hours later the second small contingent arrived, 
again with their sidearms concealed. Rua welcomed them also and said his followers were 
preparing a feast of welcome for the entire police party. One of the constables, “did not 
see the slightest signs of preparation for shooting. Everybody there was friendly until the 
arrival of the Commissioner and the armed forces.”193
Those forces came in sight around midday on a high ridge. Rua gave the order to hoist his 
flag, a large Union Jack on which the words “Kotahi te ture mo nga iwi e rua” (one law 
for both peoples) were stitched in white letters. His resentment that the law discriminated 
against Maori in a variety of ways was at the heart of Rua’s teachings, and underlay his 
defiance of the latest attempts to arrest him. However the police officers standing about 
were not alarmed by the symbolism of hoisting the flag. Said one of them, “There was not 
a smell of a revolution out there that day”.194 It would later be asked why this armed party, 
headed by a sub-Inspector and on evident good terms with their hosts, made no attempt 
to arrest Rua themselves. In a reply which unintentionally revealed an underlying purpose 
of the expedition, one said he chose to wait for the arrival of the Commissioner. 
Cullen ordered his men to load their weapons but keep the bolts locked. Alert for signs of 
an ambush, the leaders of the column halted below the marae. Rua asked a Sgt Cummings 
192  Auckland Star, 22/6/1916
193  Evidence of Const. Maloney, p. 54 P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
194  Evidence of Const. Collins, p. 48 ibid.
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to go down and ask Cullen to meet him, while the rest of police remained behind. “I want 
the soldiers kept back and a korero with the rangatira.”195 Cullen was impatient when 
Cummings delivered this request. The sergeant should arrest Rua and handcuff him, he 
said, because he had already got away once before.196 Cummings later said he found this 
uncompromising approach needlessly provocative. Unlike his superior officer, he had 
some familiarity with the protocol for welcoming guests onto a marae and knew Rua was 
entitled to expect the Commissioner to arrive with one or two officers for a formal ‘korero’, 
while the rest of the party awaited the invitation to join them. Nonetheless the entire 
police party continued to wind its way up onto the marae, rifles and revolvers flashing in 
the noon sun. The many eyewitness accounts of subsequent events are so conflicting and 
at times purposefully misleading that what happened next will always remain in doubt. 
The tragedy which unfolded from the meeting of the two utterly dissimilar figures of Cullen 
and Rua has become distorted by partisan accounts from both sides and the following 
interpretation is largely based on those points on which all parties broadly agree.
Cullen would later testify that, “I sang out ‘Haeremai’ and I beckoned to (Rua) two or 
three times.197 He took no notice of that. So I rode my horse slowly over towards him 
and… himself and the two sons turned right about and bolted towards the gulley (sic).”198 
In Rua’s conflicting testimony, “I made three steps forward and saw the policemen with 
guns... I was in the act of going up to Cullen when his police behind forced matters, they 
rushed up.”199 Mounted constables with rifles slung behind them were close behind Cullen 
as he rode onto the plateau. Several witnesses, both Maori and police, thought that Rua 
was startled by the sight of these armed men, checked his advance to Cullen and called out 
“He pu era. He kino!” (“They have guns. That’s evil!”). He then turned and, with his sons, 
195  Evidence of Const. Blakely, p. 61 ibid.
196  Cullen’s meaning here is not entirely clear, but it is probable that he refers to a 1906 attempt to arrest 
Rua in Gisborne under the Tohunga Suppression Act.
197  Cullen spoke with a pronounced Irish brogue which is likely to have affected his ability to make 
himself understood in Maori, a language he did not speak.
198  Evidence of Comm. Cullen, p. 71 P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
199  Evidence of Rua Kenana, p. 40, ibid.
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ran for the gully, pursued by police who threw him to the ground. Toko, Rua’s second 
son, continued running beyond the gully and up the path towards his father’s house. 
Cullen gave the order for Rua to be frog-marched to the marae – carried face-down by 
each of his arms and legs. As this humiliating manoeuvre was performed the first gunshot 
echoed across the marae. Who fired, and from which direction, is now impossible to 
establish but the effect of the shot is not disputed. In the testimony of Constable Rushton, 
“No-one waited for orders – everyone sailed for anyone he could get”, as “the firing 
became general”.200 Police advanced on the houses behind the marae, firing from cover, 
and Toko’s companion Te Maipi was killed instantly while Toko’s forearm was shattered 
by a rifle bullet. To this day Maungapohatu Maori claim he was then killed, execution-
style, at close range, an allegation not disputed by the Crown.201 
 
The firing grew ragged and stopped. Rua and other Maori were taken in handcuffs to the 
front of the meeting house where four wounded constables, including the young ex-RIC 
man John Neil, received medical treatment from the expedition’s surgeon. Toko Rua 
and Te Maipi lay dead and two more Maori were badly wounded. Others, also wounded, 
escaped into the bush. Of the remaining forty or so men on the marae, none was armed. 
Rua’s ‘army’ of a hundred or more warriors proved as mythical as his machine gun. 
Policemen searched the buildings for weapons and found mostly obsolete shotguns, 
small-bore rifles and revolvers, suitable for hunting rather than defence. 
To enable their wounded to recover sufficiently to withstand the return journey, the police 
remained at Maungapohatu for three days.202 On the morning of Wednesday 5 April the 
expedition left the marae, the wounded officers on horseback and Rua, his son Whatu and 
four other prisoners on foot and in handcuffs. One witness remembered, “there was police 
in front and wherever possible there were police on the side, and a rearguard. Rifles loaded 
200  Evidence of Const. Rushton, p. 135, P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
201		Statement	of	Issues,	Urewera	inquiry,	Waitangi	Tribunal,	Wai	894	#1.3.4,	no.	17.18,	no.	17.83
202  Ibid, no. 17.24
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too, because there was a rumour going that Rua’s people were going to rescue him.”203 The 
outward journey was made in more sombre mood than the spirited trek of several days 
earlier, as the deaths and injuries they had seen greatly disturbed some of the police party. 
The Gisborne men served areas with large Maori populations, and believed the arrest of 
Rua could have been accomplished amicably. The men spent much of the return journey 
debating whether they themselves could be held legally accountable for the action they had 
just taken part in. Long afterwards, one Gisborne constable said, “We worked out that Cullen 
would be guilty of eleven charges, from murder or manslaughter down to common assault. 
The death of those two men was murder; another was causing bodily harm to those that 
were wounded. There was assault with intent to kill… We wondered where we stood.” 204
203  George Beckett, Oral History archives, National Library
204  A. Butterworth, cited in Binney, Mihaia, p. 107
Like a conquering chieftain, a mounted Cullen leads his prisoners, including 
Rua Kenana, from Maungapohatu 5/4/1916. (Alexander Turnbull Library)
A
rt
hu
r 
B
re
ck
on
 F
- 
02
80
66
-1
/2
75
Czar Cullen • Chapter 5
These fears of legal repercussions proved groundless. No member of the police expedition, 
least of all its leader, was ever charged for his actions. The Gisborne men were entirely 
justified, however, in questioning the validity of the legal case against Rua and his 
followers. Almost all police charges collapsed in the course of the extraordinary trials which 
followed. The main defence lawyer soon established that Rua’s arrest was illegal because 
it was carried out on a Sunday, in clear breach of the Lord’s Day Observance Act. Rua was 
therefore fully entitled to resist arrest, “even to the extent of inflicting serious wounds 
in so doing”.205 This elementary flaw in the prosecution case was Cullen’s responsibility, 
since it was under his orders that the various police parties converged on Maungapohatu 
on a Sunday. The only apparent explanation for the mistake, which largely destroyed the 
prosecution case, is Cullen’s eagerness to effect an arrest, coupled with the disregard for 
legal principles which he displayed previously at Waihi.
The prosecution was obliged to argue that Rua’s resistance to being arrested was part 
of a conspiracy to lure the police into the gully, “within gunshot of natives posted in 
(the) bush”.206 Lundon asked why, if Maori were planning to attack the police, they had 
not tried to ambush the main party before it reached Maungapohatu. Cullen replied that 
“Rua rather wanted a theatrical display before his own people”, an interesting observation 
given his own insistence on leading his men into the fray.207 Four of the original charges 
against Rua were withdrawn and the jury returned a verdict that he was “morally guilty” 
of only the relatively minor charge of resisting arrest when originally accused of liquor 
offences  in February. The judge, a personal friend of Cullen’s, nonetheless imposed a 
sentence of a year’s hard labour followed by eighteen months’ further imprisonment.208 
Several days later eight of the twelve jurors publicly declared themselves highly critical of 
the judge’s interpretation of their verdict and called, fruitlessly, for “a full investigation 
into the alleged occurrences at Maungapohatu”.209 
205		Justice	F.	Chapman,	quoted	in	Hill,	R	Iron Hand… p. 387
206  Tole, J to Cullen, 17/4/1916, P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
207  Auckland Star 21/6/1916
208  Hill, R, Iron Hand… p. 387
209  cited in Binney, Mihaia, p. 127
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The cases against the men arrested with Rua collapsed because of contradictions in police 
evidence. This was not the outcome Cullen had hoped for, and he blamed the jurors for 
it. “The jury panel … was the poorest looking lot I have ever seen in Auckland, and I 
may say I was agreeably surprised when I heard they agreed to convict on any count.”210 
His and Herdman’s response was to prosecute the main defence witnesses, who claimed 
Skinner fired first at Maungapohatu, for perjury. This time the Crown was to make sure 
of its ground, Cullen instructed: 
“As your present jury list appears to be packed with Red Feds and other 
undesirables, I suggest you get Mr Thomas, the Sherrif, to summon more 
than double the number of men usually summoned, so that you may have 
an opportunity of standing aside such a number of jurymen as will enable 
you to secure twelve decent men of standing in the district.”211 
The Commissioner also secured the replacement of the Crown Solicitor. These strategies 
were at least partially successful and two of the defendants received sentences for perjury, 
but another was acquitted and the remaining cases dropped. 
210  Comm. Cullen J, to Tole, J, 11/8/1916, P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
211  Ibid
Commissioner Cullen at Auckland’s Supreme Court during the Rua trial 
(Alexander Turnbull Library – Murphy Collection)
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Other than legal avenues of retribution, however, were available to the state, and 
Cullen insisted that the people of Maungapohatu be charged the full costs of the 
police expedition which, together with medical and legal fees and the expenses of 
attending various lengthy trials, amounted to several thousand pounds.212 Much of the 
community’s livestock and land had to be sold, leading Rua’s followers to write that 
“the trial has entirely ruined us”, and largely achieving the aim implied by reporter 
John Birch regarding the “valuable land…tied up… in Maori hands”.213 The weapons 
confiscated at Maungapohatu were never returned. This decision, said Crown Solicitor 
Tole, was “in the public interest and in the interest of the Natives of that part of the 
country, who are not too civilized and are subject to peculiar influences”, an unpleasant 
echo of the Küao arrests of 13 years earlier.214  Even less defensibly, Rua’s flag bearing 
the slogan ‘one law for both peoples’ was also retained after the trials. Much later Cullen 
gifted it, along with several of the confiscated guns, to the Auckland Museum where it 
still lies, somewhat faded and torn but still a poignant, and possibly stolen, property.215
The 1916 raid on Maungapohatu marks one of the lowest moments in the history of New 
Zealand policing, and in the chequered record of Crown-Mäori relations, and has recently 
prompted a rare apology from the police to Rua’s descendants.216 One point not made on 
that occasion is that the fatal and other tragic consequences of the raid on Maungapohatu 
were not simply avoidable, but largely attributable to one person. According to an historian 
of Rua’s community, Commissioner Cullen:
“would not permit any act of face saving by Rua, not even in the interest of 
saving lives… Given such a potentially explosive situation, it was absolutely 
essential for Cullen to have complete control over all his men. He should 
have kept them together as a force and made sure that no one fired (even if 
fired upon) without clear orders from him or another superior officer. … 
212  Auckland Star 14/7/1916
213		Statement	of	Issues,	Urewera	inquiry,	Waitangi	Tribunal,	Wai	894	#1.3.4,	no.	17.46,	17.47;	Auckland 
Star 14/7/1916
214  Tole, JA to Supt. Auckland Police, 20/7/1917, P1 1916/233, Archives NZ
215		q.v.,	Auckland	Museum,	17/11/2004
216  Whakatane Beacon, 17/11/1998, ‘Police make peace with Rua’s family’
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In the last analysis it was Cullen who provoked the action and created the 
circumstances in which men could be killed.”217
A curious postscript further illustrates Cullen’s attitude towards the people of Maunga-
pohatu, and his readiness to override legal niceties which he found restrictive. Just a 
month after the fatal raid he returned to the Urewera, this time to take part in a hunting 
trip with local police. An honorary ranger, JR Turner, was brave enough to ask this party 
to produce their shooting licences.218 One of the hunters, Sergeant O’Hara, refused to 
show his licence and Cullen addressed the ranger in “insulting and abusive language”. 
Turner reported this incident to the permanent ranger, William Cobeldick, who took 
a cautious approach to the matter. Cobeldick had accompanied the main police party 
on the raid at Maungapohatu and was due to give evidence for the police at Rua’s 
forthcoming trial in Auckland. He therefore waited until he met both O’Hara and Cullen 
at Auckland’s Supreme Court before raising the awkward issue of their potentially illegal 
hunting expedition, professed himself satisfied with their explanation, and the matter was 
dropped.219
217  Webster, P. Rua and the Maori Millennium, p.  260-261
218 Poaching of game was a common crime in this period and shortly prior to the Maungapohatu raid, 
Cullen had exhorted his men to deal more severely with poachers. (Hill, Iron Hand… p. 328)
219 Rorke, J, Policing Two Peoples: A History of Police in the Bay of Plenty 1867-1992, Tauranga Police, 
Wellington 1993, p. 57-58. This story is not referenced, and not noted in any other publication I have 
found, but the author has personally assured me of its veracity.
79
Czar Cullen • Chapter 6
Chapter six
‘Not desirable persons to be allowed to remain in this Country’ – 
reshaping the interwar landscape
Following his retirement as Police Commissioner, Cullen’s re-employment 
as Commissioner of Alien Employment while the war was at its height gave 
him free rein to implement the worst aspects of his character, exacerbated by 
advancing irascibility and a conviction that his authority entitled him to flout 
the letter of the law. Even after full retirement, he demonstrated the same 
traits during his favourite recreational pursuit – acting as honorary warden 
of the Tongariro National Park. This latter role brought him into conflict 
with a section of the public which he was finally unable to dominate. His 
determination to reshape the physical landscape of the park in the image of a 
pre-war Ireland created an environmental hazard which continues to threaten 
the national park’s ecology.
The ill-conceived, heavy-handed and blunderingly executed Rua expedition was 
the last major action in Cullen’s long policing career. In his final vigorous months as 
Commissioner, he managed to improve general police pay rates (a governmental reward 
to the force for loyal service in the 1913 strikes), extend the use of motor vehicles in police 
work and maintain trenchant opposition to the growing role of women in the police.220 
On his retirement in December 1916 he received two British Empire awards, the Imperial 
Service Order and King’s Police Medal. His successor as Commissioner, John O’Donovan, 
was described as a refined and educated man, almost as unlike Cullen as possible, who 
proceeded to reassert the impartiality of the police as a force dedicated to public service, 
and not a tool of specific government or political policy.221 
220  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 376, p. 374, p. 398-403
221  Hill, Iron Hand…, p. 364
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Pursuing ‘enemy aliens’
At age 65 Cullen remained remarkably physically active and it was not in his nature to 
settle into secluded retirement, especially while the devastating European conflict called 
for continued rigorous policing on the home front of social groups seen as hindering the 
war effort. Following the final subjugation of the Urewera, the country’s attention was 
drawn to another remote region where an ethnic minority had also aroused resentment 
among more conventional citizens. From his years heading the huge Auckland police 
district, Cullen was more familiar than most with the Far North, then still largely roadless 
and unknown to most New Zealanders, and home to a migrant population which wartime 
xenophobia had rendered suspect and ‘alien’. 
Nearly 2000 Dalmatians, mostly young single men, had been working on the barren 
gumfields around Dargaville and Kaitaia since the 1880s. Although an 1893 Commission 
of Enquiry found them “honest, industrious, sober and frugal”, they tended to remain 
isolated by barriers of language (most spoke only Serbo-Croatian), and custom, including 
the making of wine, which gave rise to allegations of drunken excesses.222 In 1913, then-
Inspector Cullen complained that ‘Austrians’ in Mangonui made wine “purchased by both 
222		Report	of	the	Kauri	Gum	Industry	Inquiry	Commission,	AJHR 1893, H-24, p. 7
Dalmatian gumdiggers at work (From Gumdiggers of the North by Bert Hingley)
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Maori and European gum-diggers, the Maori women being supplied as well as the men, 
and… frequent drunken orgies is the result.”223 When war broke out in the Dalmatians’ 
homeland, these suspicions were sharply increased despite their evident eagerness to fight 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. All “foreign residents of New Zealand who had not been 
naturalised, and were subjects of any of the Sovereigns with whom the King was at war”, 
were required to report to the nearest police station and their movements were severely 
restricted. Policing these regulations became a substantial part of Cullen’s workload in his 
final years as Commissioner and by October 1915 more than 200 Dalmatian defaulters 
were held on the internment camp of Somes Island in Wellington harbour, many for 
minor or technical offences.224 
To those on the home front the Dalmatians at first represented an economic threat 
through their potential to compete for work at pay rates elevated by scarce manpower. 
As the war progressed and appalling losses at Gallipoli and the Somme became known, 
darker possibilities suggested themselves. Northland Dalmatians, according to their local 
paper, were being armed and trained by the nation’s enemies and merely awaited the 
signal to revolt.225 With the government actively considering introducing conscription in 
response to falling recruitment numbers, the wartime role of this body of active, mostly 
single men became a subject for national grievance. A draconian Cabinet proposal to 
intern Dalmatians on the remote Parengarenga peninsula was abandoned following 
heated objections from their leaders and local MP Gordon Coates. Massey decided 
instead to send a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the mounting allegations of 
disloyalty. This commission’s findings almost completely exonerated the Dalmatian 
community, witnesses such as Superintendent Kiely of the Auckland police reporting a 
rate of offending less than half that of European settlers and Maori. The Commissioners 
were satisfied that the “absurd, lying and mischievous rumours recently so widely 
223  Comm. Cullen Annual police report to Parliament, AJHR 1914 H-16, p. 8
224  NZPD 1915, p. 708
225  Northern Advocate 26 June 1916
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prevalent” were due entirely to the patriotic hysteria then afflicting the country.226  Yet 
the galling presence of these active, albeit draft-ineligible, young men demanded some 
other form of sacrifice, the favoured suggestion being to compel them to perform public 
works at soldiers’ pay, on pain of internment if they refused. The War Legislation Act 
1917 provided the necessary legal mechanism to conscript alien labour and the newly 
civilian John Cullen, “on account of his intimate knowledge of the Jugoslavs of NZ”, was 
appointed Commissioner for National Alien Employment to administer the punitive 
terms of the regulations.227 
Those traits which had so strongly marked the later stages of Cullen’s policing career 
– a robust disdain for minorities and a contempt for legal principles which he found 
inhibiting – were regarded in the context of wartime repression as admirably stringent. 
His reputation had revived since the industrial chaos of 1913 and he had become widely 
respected for his relentless pursuit of anti-conscription dissenters, in particular those 
accused of sedition. Less prominent sections of New Zealand society held a different 
opinion of Cullen, and the Dalmatians themselves felt they could expect “nothing but 
harsh treatment from him’”, a view which would soon be amply borne out.228 Although 
he claimed to have begun his new job with generally favourable attitudes towards the 
Dalmatians, Cullen’s official communications indicate that he assumed them all to be 
‘shirkers’ (one of the most damning terms in WW1 New Zealand), and found their 
practice of working collectively suggestive of subversion. 
From January 1918 the newly appointed Commissioner set to work with the task of 
compiling a register of all New Zealand’s Dalmatians, establishing their loyalty and 
placing them at work under government supervision. Before long Cullen came to regard 
the Dalmatian community generally as recalcitrant, disloyal and even dangerous. He 
described TP Scansie, a prominent representative of Dalmatians in Auckland, as “a sort 
226	Report	of	Aliens	Commission,	quoted	in	Auckland Star, 19/9/1916, p. 8
227 New Zealand’s ‘Dalmatians’, Serbo-Croatian by ethnicity, were commonly known as Austrians 
before WW1 and increasingly as Jugoslavs from 1917.
228	petition	to	Minister	of	Justice,	1918,	Alien	Service	Board	papers,	file	5,	Archives	NZ
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of head centre among the malcontent Dalmatians, all of whom belong to Revolutionary 
Secret Societies”.229 Solid evidence to support this startling proposition was entirely 
lacking but Cullen needed none. It “was noticeable in their general demeanour when 
they came along to my office” that two-thirds of Dalmatians were “undoubtedly hostile” 
to the Allies. Furthermore, many told Cullen that “if a strike of NZ labour occurred, 
they would not work in opposition to strikers”. These were quite sufficient grounds, 
Cullen felt, to state “that they are not desirable persons to be allowed to remain in this 
Country”.230  He advised General Allen, head of NZ Defence Forces, that, “a large number 
of them are anarchists by conviction, and openly avow themselves as Bolshevicks [sic]. 
… I am also convinced that of late Jugoslavs are hand in glove with the ‘Red Feds’ 
of New Zealand.”231 ‘Black Watch’, a prolific and anonymous correspondent to the 
ferociously anti-Dalmatian Northern Advocate newspaper, supplied lurid, bigoted and 
unsubstantiated evidence of the Dalmatians’ treasonous intentions.232 Cullen regarded 
this informant as “thoroughly acquainted with the Dalmatians, and… I must agree 
with his remarks respecting the alleged loyalty of Jugoslavs, two-thirds of whom are 
undoubtedly hostile to the Allied cause.”233
For 18 months from early 1918 Cullen directed hundreds of Yugoslavs into employment 
on railway construction, roadmaking, drainage and scrubcutting. Their leaders protested 
that some supervisors treated the men as prisoners of war or enemies, and insisted on 
addressing them with the bitterly resented term ‘dangerous enemy alien’.234  When, in 
June 1918, some gangs resorted to striking, Cullen saw this as clear proof of the ‘Bolshevik’ 
tendencies he deplored. After a strike at a swamp drainage project in Kaitaia, he told 
Allen that he considered the strikers’ spokesperson, Peter Sulenta, “to be an out-and-out 
agitator and a disloyalist at heart,” and recommended his internment “in the interests of 
229  Cullen to Allen, 30/9/1916, D 10/527, Archives NZ
230  Cullen to Col Gibbon, 21/1/1919, AD 9, Acc 86/4, Archives NZ
231  Cullen to Allen, 14/2/1919 AD 1, 9/86/4, Archives NZ
232  Cullen J to Col. Gibbon, 21/1/1919, AD 9, Acc 86/4, Archives NZ
233  Ibid 
234  Memo, Cullen to Allen, 18/2/1919, AD1, 9/86/4, Archives NZ
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the public as well as that of the Slavs of the North, who are being worked up against the 
Government”.235  This recommendation was not immediately followed and became more 
difficult to implement following the Armistice in November 1918. Cullen made it clear 
to the Yugoslavs that the regulations which compelled them to undertake public works 
would remain in force, but he was advised by Herdman’s successor as Attorney-General 
that interning Yugoslavs was now ‘unwise and unsafe’ under international law.236 
Their uncertain legal status, and postwar reconstruction in their ethnic homeland, made 
enforced work in tented labour camps even harder to bear for many of the Yugoslavs 
and absenteeism and illness among them increased. Cullen responded by interning 
the most outspoken, including Sulenta, at Featherston military camp. In a delicate and 
legally complex situation where negotiation and persuasion might have succeeded, the 
Commissioner instead displayed his advancing age, intolerance and irascibility, and chose 
to act as though the Yugoslavs enjoyed no legal rights at all. “I now consider it would have 
been much better to have interned all Jugoslavs at the outbreak of war and have given them 
the option of volunteering for Government work at soldier’s pay.”237 After the men had 
spent several months in the Featherston camp, its commandant recommended Sulenta’s 
release as “an excellent influence on Jugoslavs, strongly pro-British… He has in every 
way endeavoured to promote a friendly spirit among the men…. He has a peculiar gift 
of being able to control his fellow countrymen. They look up to him as a chief.”238 Cullen 
responded with furiously contradictory advice. “… it is not all desirable that (Sulenta) 
should be released till such time as all other internees are disposed of. He is undoubtedly 
hostile to the Allies and when at large did all he could to foment disloyalty among his 
countrymen.”239  He added a list of several other interned men who should be denied 
release, since “most of them are anarchists by conviction”.240
235  Cullen to Allen, 4/7/1918, AD 86/1-6, Archives NZ
236		Bell,	Sir	F,	to	Cullen	J,	19/2/1919,	AD	9	Acc	86/4,	Archives	NZ
237  Cullen J to Col. Gibbon. Chief of Staff, 15/2/1919 (letter), ibid
238  Camp Commandant Major Brunt to Chief of General Staff. 7/5/1919 (memo), ibid
239  Cullen J to MoD, (letter) 27/5/1919, ibid.
240  Cullen to MoD 27/5/1919 (Letter), AD 1 9/86/4, Archives NZ
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For much of 1919 Cullen continued to hotly pursue escapees and deserters from the work 
schemes and any private employers accused of harbouring ‘disloyal elements’. In August 
of that year, when the national service scheme for enemy aliens was finally dismantled, 
he prepared a list of those “who have shown themselves in any way hostile to the allied 
cause” and recommended their deportation, cancellation of naturalisation papers and 
surveillance.241 The recommendation was followed in several cases including that of Peter 
Sulenta, whose naturalisation papers were revoked after 22 years of otherwise blameless 
life in New Zealand. He chose to remain in this country and was finally granted renewed 
naturalisation by the 1936 Labour government.242
The World War One policy of compulsory government work for non-combatants proved 
as wasteful of official effort, as socially divisive and ultimately as unproductive as the policy 
of conscription, although requiring men to work should have been a great deal easier 
than requiring them to fight. Given the often-expressed willingness of most Dalmatians to 
support the local war effort, the failure of the home service scheme must be attributed in 
large part to the authoritarian, officious and intolerant approach of the Commissioner for 
National Alien Employment who administered it. Cullen demonstrated in this post, as he 
had repeatedly in his policing career, that he “showed little concern for legal principles.”243 
Like Chinese migrants many decades earlier, New Zealand’s Dalmatian community was 
denied the protection given to citizens of this country, yet subjected to national rather 
than international law. Under such conditions, 71% of those who had arrived in New 
Zealand since 1896, and overwhelmingly proved themselves hard-working, independent 
and law-abiding, chose to return to the newly created country of Yugoslavia by 1921. The 
minority who remained created farms out of Northland’s gumfields and swamp lands, 
and established a local wine industry. 
241	Cullen	J	to	Ministry	of	Defence,	‘Re:	Jugoslaves	[sic]	in	internment’,	23/8/1919,	AD	1	9/86/4,	
Archives NZ.
242 Trlin, A, Once Despised, Now Respected, Palmerston North 1979, p. 128
243	Basset,	J,	‘Colonial	Justice	–	the	treatment	of	Dalmatians	in	New	Zealand	during	the	First	World	
War’, New Zealand Journal of History, 33 (2) 1999, pp155
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Transplanting Ireland in Tongariro National Park
Upon his second retirement from public service, Cullen was free to indulge 
in his favoured leisure activities of fishing, hunting, tramping and nature-
watching. For many years he and his large family had holidayed in the 
austerely beautiful subalpine wilderness of the central North Island plateau, 
which had been declared the Tongariro National Park in 1894, the year Cullen 
took charge in the adjacent Wanganui district. He acquired a modest hut near 
the current turn-off to the Chateau and spent his summers chest-deep in chilly 
trout streams or striding across a terrain keenly reminiscent of the moors of 
his native Leitrim. The foliage and fauna, however, were strikingly different 
from his homeland. In place of summer-blooming purple heather there was 
the unchanging dull green of flax, the russet of sub-alpine ground plants and a 
native birdlife which offered no appeal to the sportsman. While still Auckland’s 
Inspector, Cullen appears to have embarked on a one-man, entirely unofficial 
campaign to transform the ecology of the National Park along the lines of an 
Irish grouse moor. Despite his public duties, the demands of wartime and his 
growing notoriety, he pursued this aim with a single-minded zeal which saw 
him dominate policy on the park for the next ten years and brought him into 
contact with a new foe, the early environmentalist. 
Cullen fishing at Tongariro National Park (Cullen family collection) 
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Envisioning the park as a future grouse moor where the wealthy of many nations could be 
enticed to shoot game birds, Cullen prevailed upon his old friend Prime Minister Massey 
for government funds to establish large numbers of heather plants, initially near his own 
hut on the western fringes of the park. Funding for this unofficial acclimatisation project 
was approved in 1914, just days before the park came under the control of the Tourist 
and Publicity Department which might otherwise have sought more control over such 
activities. Every year thereafter for almost a decade Cullen extended his heather-spreading 
project despite lacking any formal role in the park’s management beyond the apparently 
self-appointed post of honorary ranger. In a May 1914 memo to Herdman he explained 
that, “The primary objects in establishing heather on the National Park are to beautify the 
place and to provide food for grouse, blackcock and ptarmigan when they are introduced 
later on”.244 When heather plants proved slow to spread, he proposed to broadcast seed 
instead and applied through New Zealand’s High Commissioner in London to negotiate 
supplies, mentioning a number of localities including his home county of Leitrim where 
seed, including bilberry seed, might be obtained. “I may say that neither the heather nor 
bilberry plants can become noxious weeds.”245
Nostalgic memories of Ireland notwithstanding, French heather seed proved more 
suitable for New Zealand conditions and by November 1914, as British and German forces 
confronted each other in the Battle of Ypres, the first five cases of seed were delivered 
from Paris. The New Zealand High Commissioner in London noted with diplomatic 
understatement that organising this consignment had consumed valuable time and effort 
given “the dishevelled state of the Continent”.246  The following April the seed was broadcast 
by hand in the park with the help of a police constable and a warder and three prisoners 
from the nearby prison farm.247 Later that year, when Cullen reported on his progress to 
244  Cullen J to Minister of Justice, ‘Planting heather on Tongariro National Park and Upper Waimarino 
Plains’, 18/5/1914, TOI 52/15, Tongariro National Park pt. 1, Archives NZ
245		Cullen	J	to	Minister	of	Justice,	‘Proposed	procuring	of	large	quantity	of	heather	seed	for	sowing	on	
Tongariro National Park, ‘18/5/1914, TOI 52/15, Tongariro National Park pt. 1 Archives NZ
246  NZ High Commissioner, London, to PM, 13/11/1914, ibid
247  Cullen J to Wilson (GM, T&HR Dept) 7/4/1915, ibid
88
Czar Cullen • Chapter 6
the annual conference of the Acclimatisation Society, a South Island delegate questioned 
the wisdom of his actions.248 This appears to have been the first public indication of a 
gathering storm of protest at the deliberate spreading of heather.
However individual misgivings were at first no match for Cullen’s stubbornness, and for 
some years he had the valuable backing of the first head of the Tourist Department. T.E. 
Donne shared his passion for hunting, his vision of the park as a magnet for moneyed and 
adventurous foreign tourists, and his impatience with the conservation-minded. “How 
many travellers visit New Zealand to view shrubs and plants as against those who are 
attracted here by sport?” Donne demanded, when the Lands Department protested his 
importing and liberating of red deer and Tibetan bharal sheep. Fortunately these animals 
failed to survive their new environment, unlike the million trout elvers which Cullen 
released in the National Park’s rivers during 1914 and 1915. In a note to the park’s general 
manager, he added that, “We will also be planting willow cuttings with a view of hiding 
from view as much as possible these dreary patches of swamp.”249
Throughout the war years and during his subsequent term registering ‘alien’ Dalmatian 
workers, Cullen doggedly pursued his voluntary and recreational objective. He used 
Defence Department letterhead to solicit further funds directly from Massey, called on 
police and prison labour to disperse the seed, and did not hesitate to browbeat the senior 
civil servants nominally in charge of park policy.250 His was a public-spirited enterprise, he 
insisted, and any outlay from the public purse would eventually be greatly recompensed 
by the income which would result. “The growing of heather and the importation of 
Grouse could be made a very profitable proposition for [the Tourist and Publicity 
Department]” he assured its general manager. “Assuming that you create a Grouse moor 
of say ten thousand acres to begin with, and that only one bird per acre is killed each year 
valued at say 5/- per bird, you can readily see what a revenue there could be from this 
source alone.”251
248  Evening Post, 4/8/1915
249  JC to GM, Tourist Dept, (handwritten), 15/7/1917, TOI 52/15, Tongariro National Park pt. 1, 
Archives NZ
250  Cullen J to PM Massey (Defence Dept letterhead), 15/11/1918, ibid.
251  Cullen J to GM, Tourist Dept, (Defence Dept letterhead), 4/6/1919, ibid.
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As opposition to his actions mounted, Cullen maintained his policy of going straight to 
the top. At a race meeting at Auckland’s Ellerslie course, he again buttonholed Massey and 
gained approval to import further large quantities of seed at state expense, dismissing all 
concerns at the environmental impacts. “…the sowing and planting of heather is in no 
way detrimental to the native vegetation on the park. The heather now growing thereon 
has now reached its full height and the native plants growing amongst it appear to be doing 
better than those where heather is not growing.”252 It was only in the period of postwar 
reconstruction that a new national ethos began to seriously challenge the iron will of the 
irascible former Commissioner. When, in 1919, he proposed to introduce giant white 
buttercup from the South Island high country, his letter was marked ‘seek opinion of Dr 
Cockayne’.253 Dr Leonard Cockayne, then the country’s pre-eminent botanist, had carried 
out a survey of the National Park’s flora in 1909, shortly before Cullen’s depredations 
there began. He provided a radical reassessment of the concept of a national park, as a site 
for conservation rather than development. “I am greatly averse to any tampering with the 
natural vegetation of national parks, scenic reserves etc. It is the natural dressing of the 
landscape which makes the special character of the scenery of any place.”254
By 1921 the flowering heather had begun to paint whole swathes of the park with its pink 
bloom, and newspaper letter columns were sharply divided over the concept of natural 
beauty. While some welcomed the ‘sea of pink’255, others saw the deliberate introduction of 
heather as nothing less than vandalism.256 The latter tended to be those, such as members 
of the Tararua Tramping Club, who knew the volcanic plateau region best and prized its 
distinctiveness. Professional bodies also weighed in to the debate, the Wanganui Chamber 
of Commerce demanding the eradication of heather from the park,257 and the Director 
252  Cullen J to GM (handwritten) 24/12/1920, TOI 52/15, Tongariro National Park pt. 1, Archives NZ
253  Cullen J to GM, Tourist Dept, (Alien Service Board letterhead), 24/10/1919, ibid.
254  Cockayne L, to GM, Dept Tourist and HRs, 9/1/1920, ibid.
255  Harre, NZ Herald, 10 June 1921
256  Joosten, Evening Post, 7 March 1921
257  Sec., Wanganui Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Defence, 9/6/1921, TOI 52/15, Tongariro 
National Park pt 1, NA
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General of Agriculture agreeing with a senior colleague’s view that, “The general public 
in years to come would highly appreciate the glory of a park like this if it was planted 
exclusively with New Zealand plants.” Cullen was not named, but quite possibly invoked, 
when the Director General said, “… apart from sentimental reasons no real argument can 
be put forward for the establishment of [heather].”258 True to form, Cullen responded 
with vindictiveness. After a ski club forwarded a complaint to the park management, he 
retaliated, “I know who the parties are who inspire these paragraphs in the Press but they 
are nobodies who carry no weight anywhere.”259
Yet the now-superannuated Cullen found that he himself exerted less authority than in 
his prime, and his top-level contacts were drying up. In early 1921 the Minister for Tourist 
and Health Resorts advised Cullen that Massey “has referred to me your application for 
£100 for planting heather seed. At present I am not able to authorise such expenditure. 
In future please address all such communications directly to me.” Attached was a note 
stating that the practice of trying to circumvent park management by appealing directly 
to the prime minister, “has been mentioned to [Cullen] before)”.260 The final blow fell 
in June 1921 when a terse telegram from the Tourist Dept instructed Cullen “no more 
sowing to be done until further advised”.261
The following year, however, management of the National Park transferred from the 
Tourist Department to an elected Board, and as a Board member Cullen felt empowered 
to see his plan to completion. He told the Auckland Acclimatisation Society that some 
2000 acres of the park were now covered in heather, and that he had ordered from England 
a consignment of grouse which, “will find in the heather a national food”.262 This and 
several further shipments of birds failed to survive the long journey to the Antipodes and 
by 1924, when Cullen finally received six healthy grouse, the government had resolved 
258  Director General of Agriculture to GM, Dept of Tourist and Health Resorts, 29/7/1921, ibid.
259  Cullen J to GM, Dept of Tourist and Health Resorts, 22/3/1921, ibid.
260  Nosworthy, Minister Dept of Tourist and Health Resorts to Cullen, 21/4/1921, ibid.
261  Touristo to Cullen, Telegram 21/6/1921, TOI 52/15, Tongariro National Park pt. 1, Archives NZ
262  Evening Post, 23/12/22
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that, “It should not be permitted to anyone to convert [the park] into a preserve for 
imported game or birds.”263  Even this clearcut legal prohibition did not deter the obdurate 
self-appointed gamekeeper. He consigned the birds to the Acclimatisation Society, thus 
evading responsibility for violating the decree against importing and introducing them to 
New Zealand. The Society’s chairman implored Cullen to release the grouse only well away 
from the national park but according to several accounts, Cullen released the unfortunate 
birds just across the road from the park boundary, then shooed them into the heather.264 
For once his determined rule-flouting failed him. The birds did not survive to breed and 
create yet another alien population in a landscape already terminally compromised.
Today each February and March sees the tussocklands west and south of Ruapehu covered 
with a mauve haze which, for all its visual appeal, suppresses native ground cover and affects 
indigenous insects. The heather continues to spread to new areas of the park, a process 
accelerated by climate change. The Department of Conservation’s efforts to control the 
invasive plant using yet another introduced species, the European heather beetle, have so 
far had only marginal success and may take a century to make a significant impact.265 John 
Cullen’s heather-sowing campaign may well prove his most enduring legacy.
For nearly 20 years after his final retirement from public life this indefatigable figure 
remained vigorously active, living in a large house (since demolished) in Auckland’s 
Remuera Road with his pointer dogs kennelled underneath. His wife Rachael, the mother 
of 11 surviving children, died in 1917 and Cullen later married a much younger woman, 
the daughter of fellow police officer Charles Hendrey, who had served under him with 
distinction as an Auckland Sub-Inspector. Through the 20s and 30s, policing evolved 
in directions Cullen can hardly have approved, as the use of arms became increasingly 
uncommon and the role of the police shifted decisively from suppressing disorder, by 
263  cited in Restless Land, Dept of Conservation, 1998, p. 115
264  See, eg. ibid p. 116
265  Peterson P et al, ‘Biological control of heather update’, Powerpoint presentation, Landcare Research 
2006
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force if necessary, to maintaining order by general consent. Final proof of the dismaying 
direction of the nation came, according to Cullen’s descendants, in 1936 when the view 
from his house was spoilt by the appearance on the Orakei skyline of Auckland’s first state 
houses, and the ascension to government of the very labour agitators he had hounded 
and imprisoned some 20 years earlier. Three years later, in October 1939, John Cullen 
died aged 89, of pneumonia contracted after a spring day’s trout fishing in his beloved 
Tongariro National Park.266 
 
266  Personal communication, Kathleen McArthur (John Cullen’s grand-daughter), 19/2/2004
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Conclusion 
This study has tended to concentrate, I suggest unavoidably, on several of the 
most historically significant moments in Cullen’s long policing career, and it is 
important to ask how representative these were of his overall contribution to the 
development of the country’s police force. This may be partly answered by noting 
that Cullen’s Commissionership and preceding senior police roles coincided 
with a relatively low-crime period, due to factors such as a greater proportion of 
women in the population and a subdued and increasingly acculturated Maori 
minority. As Hill points out, it was in the interests of the state as a whole for 
policing to develop in this period along relatively benign and consensual lines, 
as the most economical solution to social control.267 Seen in this wider social 
context, Cullen’s actions appear even more unnecessarily divisive and harshly 
confrontational than they do from a narrower, purely policing, perspective. 
A related question, raised in the introduction to this study, is whether Cullen adopted his 
tactics of violent confrontation in the interests of the government of the day or on behalf 
of his own concept of social order and values. I have aimed to show that the profoundly 
inappropriate stance adopted for the 1916 Urewera expedition was simply a progression 
(albeit exaggerated under wartime conditions) of a consistently intolerant and condign 
policing style practised for many years, even under much more liberal political masters 
than William Massey. Cullen must therefore take primary responsibility for the disastrous 
failings of the Urewera expedition, for the escalation of public violence in the 1913 strike 
and for the fatal finale to the Waihi strike. He may have convinced himself, and close 
supporters such as Alexander Herdman, that his actions were carried out on behalf of 
an elected government and of a general social consensus, but he did not feel the need 
to test that assumption, and refused to give weight to the many criticisms of his actions, 
including those from other politicians. 
267  Hill, Iron Hand… p. 413
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Tracing Cullen’s modus operandi from his early RIC training through to the period 
following his Commissionership reveals a remarkably consistent set of attitudes favouring 
the para-military thinking of the 19th century, a preference for high-level deal-making over 
democratic principle, a rancorous personal manner and a readiness to bend or break the 
law in the name of the values he upheld. Those values, founded in the grossly inequitable 
and coercive society of his birth and later applied to the very different society of his 
adopted country, were severely conservative and led Cullen, after a lifetime of attempting 
to shape New Zealand society along more hierarchical lines, to reshape a portion of its 
environment in the image of a long-lost semi-feudal Ireland. 
Cullen allowed his prejudices, which grew more rigid as he aged and gained seniority and 
influence, to affect his judgement and influence his tactics, at times with truly disastrous 
results. His relatively low historical profile may well be deliberate on his part and testifies 
to the effectiveness of his tactics at managing the media. It has been a central purpose of 
this study to overcome the effects of Cullen’s adroit and prescient media management and 
uncover his leading role at the centre of some of the key events of his time. As Cullen’s 
biographer by default, I have aimed to be fair and open-minded in drawing judgement 
on his part in those operations with which his name is most strongly associated, and to 
take note of his many contributions, large and small, to the force he served throughout 
his working life. Yet it has proved impossible to avoid the conclusion that my subject 
was a strikingly unpleasant personality who repeatedly brought the force into disrepute, 
tragically exacerbated public confrontations and vindictively hounded opponents, 
including many of his colleagues. It is a fundamental contention of this study that such an 
unadmirable figure is as worthy of historical attention as his better-known contemporaries. 
The development of the police force has always been linked with civil disturbance, social 
conflict and repression, and just as those unattractive yet inescapable facets of our society 
deserve careful scrutiny, so do the individuals who control and propagate them. 
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